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Smart guns, which originally meant personalized guns that only the 
owner could fire, had a false start as a promising new technology several 
years ago. Nevertheless, policymakers have shown renewed interest in the 
wake of highly publicized incidents of gun violence, as well as advances 
in technology. The first generation of smart guns foundered on problems 
with the reliability of the technology, as well as a legislative misstep that 
would have banned all other guns as soon as smart guns appeared in the 
retail market. This proposal triggered massive boycotts of certain 
manufacturers and dealers and a subsequent abandonment of the project 
by the gun industry overall. Newer technologies, however, such as 
improved biometric grip identifiers, precision-guided rifles that rarely 
miss, blockchain or “glockchain” automated tracking, and optical scopes 
that send videos to smartphones, have revived interest in  smart gun 
products. At least one state in 2019 (New Jersey) passed carefully drafted 
legislation promoting the introduction of personalized guns, while another 
(Arizona) passed legislation discouraging the adoption of digital ledgering 
technology for firearms. In addition, some leading candidates in the 2020 
primary advocated for smart guns as a solution to gun violence. This paper 
will explore the emerging second-generation smart gun technology, its 
potential for adoption by the military, law enforcement, and civilian 
markets, and the realistic prospects for improvements in safety or 
reduction in gun violence. This discussion will include the disconnect 
between policy agendas regarding firearm safety and technological 
enhancements driven by current consumer demand—and the murky moral 
assumptions that undergird both.  
 
  *Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law – Houston. The author would like 
to thank the editors of the Penn State Law Review for the opportunity to publish and for 
their excellent editorial work, which significantly improved the manuscript. Research 
assistants Greta Carlson and Sofia Colorado provided invaluable assistance with this 
project.  
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Constructive debate about gun policy continues to falter in part 
because of basic disagreement over what the right to keep and bear 
arms is for. Consider “smart guns” – weapons that work only when 
activated by an authorized user.  Reaction to even the availability of 
such weapons, much less their requirement, and been swift and 
caustic.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a gun that cannot miss, or a gun that only the owner can fire. 
Imagine decentralized, blockchain-based background checks for gun 
purchases, as well as owner registration and concealed carry permits, not 
controlled by any individual, but more reliable than the current FBI-
administered system.2 Technological improvements to existing products 
and tools can make guns safer, more effective, or more interactive for the 
user or with other tools and products. Emerging technology for firearms—
so-called “smart guns” and related electronic firearm accessories—run 
along these same three lines. Some smart gun technology is meant to 
enhance safety, as with personalized guns shootable only by a designated 
user, or computerized gun safes or locking holsters.3 Other smart gun 
technology does the opposite, at least arguably, by making firearms more 
lethal, through enhanced accuracy and power.4 A third emerging line of 
 
1. JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: 
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 151 (2018). 
2. See Anthony W. Metzler, Note, Triggered: Mass Shootings, Smart Gun 
Technology and the Search for Solutions, 19 J. HIGH TECH. L. 103, 111 (2018). 
3. See Matt Schroeder, New Technologies and Small Arms Control: Preventing 
Unauthorized Acquisition and Use, in BEHIND THE CURVE: NEW TECHNOLOGIES, NEW 
CONTROL CHALLENGES 75, 82–88 (Benjamin King & Glenn McDonald eds., Small Arms 
Survey 2015), available at https://bit.ly/2UDeKau; see also FRANK MINITER, THE FUTURE 
OF THE GUN 227–33 (2014) (discussing personalized smart guns). 
4. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 48–53 (describing TrackingPoint rifles). 
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smart gun technology permits interactivity, such as live-streaming the 
view from the gun’s scope,5 or by tracking discharges, location, and gun 
possession through online blockchain ledgers.6 Interactivity, in turn, paves 
the way for a fourth line of emerging firearm technology: automated 
recording, memorializing, and archiving events for subsequent replay, 
which can enhance accountability (say, for police shootings of unarmed 
suspects)7 and justification, corroborating an otherwise disputable claim 
that a shooting was in self-defense. All these technologies are potentially 
disruptive for the legal regime governing firearm possession and use—a 
legal arena already fraught with intense controversy.   
Reforming gun policy, and gun culture, in the United States is a 
source of ongoing political divisiveness and acrimony. Firearm 
technology interacts in complex ways with the Second Amendment,8 the 
evolving common law surrounding the Second Amendment in the lower 
courts, and in statutes, administrative regulations, and law enforcement. 
Congressional enactments in the last two decades have elevated gun rights 
over other legal rules and legal authorities, such as common law tort 
liability,9 meaning the prospect of tort liability and the duty of care has not 
driven the introduction of safety features with firearms as it has with other 
consumer products. From a market standpoint, some of the emerging 
firearm technologies are dependent on proposed statutory or regulatory 
mandates for the adoption of new safety features. Alternatively, rather than 
depending on legal requirements to encourage its adoption, other emerging 
technology functions either as a workaround to existing legal restrictions 
and bottlenecks or as a means for thwarting existing laws or policy. The 
academic literature to date about “smart guns” focuses exclusively on 
personalized firearms or electronically controlled safety mechanisms 
(ECSMs)—weapons that only the owner or a designated user can fire.10 
The technology has existed in various forms for many years, but it has 
been evolving, and other “smart” technologies for firearms have now 
emerged.  
 
5. See id. at 22–24. 
6. See Robin Kester, Demystifying the Internet of Things: Industry Impact, 
Standardization Problems, and Legal Considerations, 8 ELON L. REV. 205, 215 (2016) 
(discussing this technology as adopted by two police departments). 
7. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 232–33. 
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
9. See Stephen P. Teret, Key Perspectives and Insights on Personalized Guns, in 
PERSONALIZED FIREARMS AND ELECTRONIC SAFETY DEVICES: PERSPECTIVES 24, 28 (Small 
Arms Survey 2013), available at https://bit.ly/2ycfEmN. 
10. See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 226 (2d ed. 2017) (“The 
regulatory agency should actively promote new technology that will make society safer.  
For example, ‘smart’ or personalized guns that cannot be fired except by authorized users 
can help prevent unintentional injuries of children and adolescents and limit criminal use 
of stolen guns.”). 
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Weapons, considered a type of technology, inherently pose both 
moral hazard and adverse selection issues, as do some other technologies. 
From a moral hazard standpoint, having a gun brings feelings of 
confidence, security,11 and sometimes even dominance. Depending on 
your position on gun rights, this feeling is either the essence of 
“freedom,”12 or a dangerous delusion. Either way, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, those who believe they have reduced or eliminated their 
odds of injury or premature death will take more risks than they would 
otherwise. With guns, this might mean walking alone in high-crime 
neighborhoods after dark;13 standing up for yourself in an argument or, in 
the face of an affront, intervening to help others who seem to be in danger; 
or to give vent to your indignation at rude drivers on the road.  When we 
insure or ensure ourselves against some harm, we simply do not need to 
be as careful to avoid it. Adverse selection is a screening effect: suppose, 
hypothetically, that the people you would least want to have guns are the 
most likely to want them, and are disproportionately likely to obtain them. 
There are individual exceptions, of course, in any moral hazard or adverse 
selection scenario—some individuals will continue to be cautious even 
when their risks are low, and some low-risk individuals will opt into the 
risk pool. Some cautious, safe, self-controlled, dispassionate people own 
guns. Moral hazard and adverse selections are about the general tendency 
of a group taken together.  
The four smart gun technologies discussed below each purport to 
either make guns safer by preventing misuse, making guns more lethal by 
maximizing accuracy, or validating the legitimacy of firing a gun for after-
the-fact inquiries. The ensuing discussion attempts to explain each of these 
emerging smart gun technologies, and to situate them in their legal and 
social context. A secondary, more normative agenda is also present: 
notwithstanding the advantages these new technologies afford, each one 
can intensify the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that are 
inherent in firearm ownership. For example, a smart gun with electronic 
safeguards against theft or misuse allows the owner to be more carefree 
about her gun than she would otherwise be (the moral hazard problem). 
Similarly, by reducing the likelihood of theft, the accidental death of one’s 
children, or a grab-away shooting, it further skews the me-versus-others 
internal calculus that drives adverse selection. Additionally, a gun with 
electronics to make it infallibly accurate, and therefore super-lethal, will 
appeal the most to those who are most bent on killing (adverse selection), 
and ratchet up the confidence boost or power trip that guns already provide 
(moral hazard). Further, a gun that vindicates the shooter after a killing 
 
11. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 233–34. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
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would do the same—making the owner less hesitant to shoot and appealing 
disproportionately to those most likely to shoot. 
The following discussion will arrange topics by type of technology: 
personalized smart guns (authorized-user trigger locks), sophisticated 
precision-guided firearms, recordkeeping guns, and “glockchain” 
(blockchain ledgering) guns. Part II focuses on personalized smart guns, 
the most-discussed type of smart gun technology. Given the longstanding 
and ongoing controversy over this type of smart gun, and the repeated but 
unsuccessful incidents of government intervention to spur the 
development of these products, this will be the longest section of the 
article. Most academic and legal literature up to now uses the term “smart 
gun” synonymously with electronically personalized guns;14 the technical 
term in international military contexts for these weapons is ECSMs.15 The 
promise these devices have for reducing firearm injuries and fatalities 
makes their deficiencies and unmarketability all the more frustrating.  
One of the goals of this symposium contribution is to expand the 
common understanding of “smart guns” to include other emerging firearm 
technologies that could prove just as disruptive to the industry—and to 
firearm policy—as ECSMs or personalized smart guns. In this vein, Part 
III discusses a newer and far less familiar type of smart gun, what I will 
call “Guns That Cannot Miss”16 (though the technical terminology would 
be precision-guided firearms),17 a subset of autonomous weapons systems 
 
14. See, e.g., Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: 
What Hath Heller Wrought?, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1143, 1175–76 (2015); Philip 
J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, “Smart” Guns: A Technological Fix for Regulating the 
Secondary Market, 20 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 38, 39 (2002); Adam Crepelle, Concealed 
Carry to Reduce Sexual Violence Against American Indian Women, 26 KAN. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 236, 254–55 (2017) (advocating arming Native American women with smart guns 
to defend themselves against sexual violence); Barack Obama, The President’s Role in 
Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 857–58 (2017) (“We’ve also 
jumpstarted the development of smart gun technology. As long as we’ve got technology to 
prevent a criminal from stealing and using your smartphone, then we should be able to 
prevent the wrong person – including kids – from pulling the trigger on a gun.”); William 
F. Godbold IV, Note, Constitutional Law – Shooting Blanks: Smart Gun Mandates and 
Their Concomitant Constitutional, Regulatory, Public Policy, and Practical Issues, 37 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 167, 169 (2014); Tyler J. Kimberly, Comment, A Higher 
Caliber of Regulation: Is Making Smart-Gun Technology Mandatory Constitutionally 
Permissible?, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2014); Jessica M. Lujan, Note, Half-
Cocked: “Smart Gun” Mandates Are Premature and Unconstitutional Under the 
Prevailing “Undue Burden” Test, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 500, 501–05 (2018); BLOCHER 
& MILLER, supra note 1 at 151; HEMENWAY, supra note 10 at 226; Metzler, supra note 2, 
at 111.  
15. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 82. 
16. See Mark Dewey, A New ‘Smart Rifle’ Decides When to Shoot and Rarely Misses, 
NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (May 15, 2013), https://n.pr/2UIW1tY. 
17. See Mike Gassaway, Touring Trackingpoint’s Facility, Where Precision Guided 
Firearms Are Made [Videos], GUNS.COM (Aug. 14, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://bit.ly/39pOS7g (video tour of facilities of the manufacturer of civilian-marketed 
precision-guided firearms, with discussion of the weapons). 
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(AWS).18 These sophisticated weapons use computer processing and 
advanced optics to lock on targets—including moving targets—and to 
correct for wind, humidity, Coriolis effect, rifle cant, weight of the 
cartridge, and even the absence of light. High-end models can hit a moving 
target in the dark at 1400 yards (about eight-tenths of a mile),19 even with 
an unskilled shooter. They also enable an operator at a remote location to 
fire the gun while another person merely carries it on location and points 
it toward the target. Naturally, such weapons are especially appealing for 
military use,20 but they are available for the civilian market, though outside 
the price range of most gun purchasers. Even so, these next-generation 
weapons with super-lethality could force our legal system to revisit long-
held assumptions about the proper line between intentional and 
unintentional homicides, attempted versus completed crimes, the right of 
self-defense, police shootings of fleeing suspects, and even the presumed 
sporting virtues of hunting.21   
Part IV discusses the emerging technology of guns that track 
everything—not only audio/video uploads from the scope, but also 
nuanced movement tracking, similar to the “black box” in an automobile 
that constantly records speed, acceleration, braking, and turns. These guns 
record (often in encrypted form) every discharge, but also the angle and 
location at the instant of discharge, every movement of the gun before and 
after discharge, and so on. Creating such a record presents enhanced 
accountability for law enforcement, similar to the policy rationales for 
police bodycams, and could also assist with documenting the justifications 
for shootings, thus validating a subsequent claim of self-defense by a 
civilian gun owner. Finally, Part V will briefly address emerging gun 
blockchain or “glockchain” technology, which of course overlaps with 
Part IV on recording the location and usage of the gun—but the online, 
anonymous blockchain ledgers could assist with owner registration, 
tracing crime guns (chain of custody), locating stolen guns, and even with 
 
18. See Christopher P. Toscano, “Friend of Humans”: An Argument for Developing 
Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 189, 232 (2015). 
19. See ShadowTrax8, TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/2QNPLjD (last visited May 19, 
2020) (“If you need knock-down power for brown bears or African cats, this is your gun. 
If you need battalion-level sniper capabilities in a combat zone, this is your gun. Whatever 
your need, with a precision-guided lock range of more than ¾ of a mile, pulling the trigger 
on the ShadowTrax8 is like calling in an airstrike.”). 
20. See Kyle Mizokami, The U.S. Army’s New Rifle Comes With Tech Found in Tanks 
and iPhones, POPULAR MECHS. (June 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/2JjsMbW; Peter Suciu, U.S. 
Army Takes Aim at Developing Smart Gun Technology, CLEARANCEJOBS (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2WLFpo1 (“The Army’s specifications for this next-gen firearm are that it 
would be equipped with a “smart rail” system that could provide communications and 
power interface between the actual weapon and a computerized onboard system.”). 
21. For a thoughtful background discussion about the relationship between lethality 
and Second Amendment rights, see Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality, Public 
Carry, and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 294–300 (2016) [hereinafter 
Blocher & Miller, Lethality]. 
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concealed carry permits, hunting licenses, and firearm purchase 
background checks.   
There are other new or emerging technologies related to firearms that 
also fall outside the scope of this Article, even though they deserve more 
academic commentary. These are 3D-printed guns (which are 
rudimentary, not technologically sophisticated, weapons),22 
microstamping (serial number imprints on bullet casings that tie each 
bullet fired to the gun that discharged it),23 and gunshot or gun detection 
technology,24 which uses AI and other technologies to recognize and alert 
security or law enforcement personnel instantly to the presence of guns or 
where shots have been fired.25 In addition, it seems appropriate at the 
 
22. See, e.g., Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 420 F.Supp.3d 1130, 1136–38 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 12, 2019) (invalidating Trump Administration decision to remove online 3D 
gun designs from the United State Munitions List). See generally Jessica Berkowitz, 
Computer-Aided Destruction: Regulating 3D-Printed Firearms Without Infringing on 
Individual Liberties, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 51, 81–84 (2018) (proposing expansion of 
background checks to cover ammunition purchases as  the best remedy to the regulatory 
challenges posed by 3D-printed firearms); James B. Jacobs & Alex Haberman, 3D-Printed 
Firearms, Do-It-Yourself Guns, & The Second Amendment, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 
(2017) (focusing on Second Amendment challenge to the government’s attempt to keep 
3D printing firearms software off the Internet); Rory K. Little, Guns Don’t Kill People, 3D 
Printing Does? Why the Technology Is a Distraction from Effective Gun Controls, 65 
HASTINGS L.J. 1505 (2014) (arguing that gun control advocates should focus primarily on 
regulating criminal use of guns, and not on the technology used to manufacture them); 
Michael L. Smith, The Second Amendment Implications of Regulating 3D Printed 
Firearms, 31 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 60 (2015) (arguing that most restrictions on 3D 
printed firearms will survive Second Amendment challenges). 
23. See generally Pena v. Lindley, 898 F.3d 969, 981–86 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding 
California’s microstamping requirement, with a detailed explanation of the technology). 
24. See generally Amanda Busljeta, Comment, How an Acoustic Sensor Can Catch 
a Gunman, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 211 (2016) (discussing the 
acoustic sensor technology and its applications); Daniel S. Lawrence et al., Evaluation of 
Gunshot Detection Technology to Aid in the Reduction of Firearms Violence, URBAN INST. 
(Oct. 2019) https://bit.ly/2X7Hj2s; Kester, supra note 6, at 215 (“ShotSpotter™ is able to 
determine when and where gunshots are fired in public using connected microphones that 
are installed throughout a city, town, or college campus. As a result, police may be able to 
quickly determine an active shooter’s location . . . [though] this technology is currently 
limited to outdoor gunfire . . . .”). See also SHOTSPOTTER INC., https://bit.ly/2JioPV9 (last 
visited May 19, 2020). 
25. See, e.g., Javed Iqbal et al., Orientation Aware Object Detection with Application 
to Firearms (Apr. 22, 2019), available at https://bit.ly/33RyhrG. Numerous courts have 
already issued opinions pertaining to police use of the technology. See, e.g., State v. 
Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2019) (“A ShotSpotter device detected eleven 
gunshots between 12:06:52 a.m. and 12:07:34 a.m. on July 27.”); United States v. Johnson, 
365 F.Supp.3d 89, 93 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing police dispatch based on ShotSpotter 
alerting authorities to moving (drive-by) shooter); United States v. Wilcher, 744 F.App’x. 
604, 605 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A few minutes later, police officers, 911 callers, and the city’s 
Shot Spotter system heard gunfire from a high-powered weapon.”); Commonwealth v. 
Raglin, 178 A.3d 868, 872–74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (holding that police had reasonable 
suspicion to detain defendant for shooting detected by shot spotter); Commonwealth v. 
Holnesss, 101 N.E.3d 310, 313 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018) (“At 4:10 A.M., six minutes after 
the report of the shooting at 92 Wales Street, Boston police were dispatched to respond to 
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outset to mention that advanced electronics are not the only technological 
advancements happening in the firearm industry. My twelve-month 
review of manufacturers’ catalogs or websites and gun enthusiast blogs 
that review new gun models suggests that manufacturers are innovating to 
meet intense consumer demand for firearms optimized for concealed 
carrying, now that all states permit the practice. This means engineering 
with new materials and new designs to make guns smaller, lighter, and still 
lethal with one shot. Of course, Hollywood depictions of gunslingers 
continue to feature large, imposing pistols and rifles for dramatic effect. 
Yet pocket-size guns dominate the new product lines from manufacturers 
because of the mushrooming number of concealed carriers. On the other 
end of the gun companies’ product line are the ever-popular assault rifles, 
and for these, the holy grail of manufacturing research and development 
might now be larger and larger capacity magazines. Imagine a dependable, 
widely-available 200-round magazine for a semi-automatic assault rifle—
a shooter could fire 200 times without reloading. It is on the horizon. The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may have a more significant role in the 
future of guns in America than the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (“ATF”) does now. 
II. PERSONALIZED SMART GUNS (ELECTRONICALLY CONTROLLED 
SAFETY MECHANISMS) 
Personalized firearms, to which the words “smart guns” usually refer, 
use internal technology to limit use of the gun to authorized users. 
Advocates of personalized smart gun technology contend that it could save 
many lives by preventing unauthorized usage by criminals and 
unsupervised children.26 In theory, if only the owner or other designated 
users could fire a gun, then that gun would be rendered useless if stolen or 
resold on the black market.27 Unsupervised children could not injure 
themselves or others if they find or access an adult’s firearms, and older 
adolescents could not take their parents’ or older siblings’ firearms to 
school to perpetrate a mass shooting or even settle a score with a rival 
classmate.28 In addition, police officers would not be at risk of injury from 
 
a ‘ShotSpotter’ device activation at 276 Talbot Avenue . . . .”); State v. Hill, 851 N.W.2d 
670, 774–78 (Neb. 2014) (finding SpotShotter reliable and alerting admissible as evidence 
at trial); United States v. Devers, 530 F.App’x. 608, 608 (8th Cir. 2013) (“As relevant, the 
trial included the testimony of two police officers who were dispatched to an Omaha 
residence after the city’s Shot Spotter system indicated that approximately four shots had 
been fired there.”). 
26. See HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 138. 
27. See Smart Guns, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., https://bit.ly/3dvYiRT ([last visited]). 
28. See id. 
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their own firearms if arrestees wrestle or grab the gun away from the 
officer.29 
A. The Desire to Save Lives 
The concept of an electronically-personalized firearm first appeared 
in the mid-1990s as a possible solution to police weapon “takeaways,” 
where a police officer is “injured or killed when a criminal wrestles the 
officer’s firearm away and uses it against the officer.”30 Such a safeguard 
could be especially useful for law enforcement officers—16% of all 
officers killed in the line of duty are due to “takeaways” (snatching the 
officer’s service weapon and turning it on the officer), or that of another 
officer, during an attempted arrest.31 Nevertheless, 20 years after the 
invention of the first smart gun, the technology remains underdeveloped 
and underused.32 
The same authorized-user features would also reduce accident-
related gun death as well as the suicide rate among youths, and curtail the 
number of guns available on the black market. Accidental shootings make 
up 18% of all gun injuries and 1.3% of all gun deaths.33 The increasing 
demands for ease of use and lower trigger weights in handguns in recent 
years have made modern handguns “child’s play” to operate and create a 
“greater potential hazard if they end up in the wrong hands.”34 With 
personalized smart guns, unintended discharges during cleaning or regular 
handling of the gun would be drastically reduced because the weapon 
would not be authorized to fire unless held correctly.35 One study of gun 
 
29. See id.; see also HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 138 (“A smart gun might also help 
police, who are sometimes killed with their own service firearms.”). 
30. See NAT’L. SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND., “AUTHORIZED USER RECOGNITION” 
(A.K.A. “SMART GUN”) TECHNOLOGY (2013), https://bit.ly/3dAudAT; Schroeder, supra 
note 3, at 83 (“Equipping firearms with ECSMs could reduce the number of security 
officers injured or killed by assailants who gain access to their weapons (or the weapon of 
another security officer).”). 
31. See D. R. Weiss, Smart Gun Technology Project Final Report, SANDIA NAT’L 
LABS., May 1996, at 2, available at https://bit.ly/2Ul9IjQ.  
32. See Amy Fawcett, Is Smart Gun Technology Viable? Smart Gun Symposium 
Recap, WASH. TECH. INDUSTRY ASS’N (Feb. 4, 2015) https://bit.ly/3btTASY; see also 
Schroeder, supra note 3, at 83 (“Nonetheless, sales of firearms equipped with ECSMs have 
been modest to date. Some promising technologies are still in development, and it may be 
many years before they are available for purchase. Of the 13 ECSMs assessed for their 
technological maturity . . . only three were categorized as an ‘Advanced Prototype or 
Production-Ready Design.’”). 
33. See Gun Violence Statistics, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., https://bit.ly/2vUCL4z (last 
visited May 19, 2020).  
34. Günter Maximilian Hefner & Karl Friedrich Giebel, Electronic Firearm Safety 
Devices, in SMALL ARMS SURVEY, PERSONALIZED FIREARMS AND ELECTRONIC SAFETY 
DEVICES: PERSPECTIVES 6, 6 (2013). 
35. Unintentional discharges occur most often when the gun owner is cleaning the 
gun. (Necessary since already explained cleaning the gun above the line?) See VIOLENCE 
POL’Y CTR., “SMART GUNS” BACKGROUNDER 2 (2016). 
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deaths in Maryland and Wisconsin found that approximately 37% of 
unintended deaths would have been avoided had the guns in question been 
personalized.36 Personalized smart guns could also help reduce the number 
of childhood gun-related deaths.37 The majority of unintentional shooting 
deaths involve people under the age of 24.38 Given that most firearm 
injuries to younger children involve guns belonging to their parents or 
relatives,39 these shootings could be preventable, as most children would 
not be authorized users of a smart gun.40 If only a designated user could 
fire any individual gun, then presumably children would be unable to play 
with or discharge the guns while unsupervised, and therefore would not 
accidentally shoot themselves, their siblings, or friends.41 As Harvard 
public health professor, David Hemenway, explains, fewer children would 
suffer firearm injuries “if guns were ‘personalized’ or designed so that 
only authorized users could fire them. To this end, manufacturers could 
incorporate current technology—such as magnetic devices, radio 
frequency transponders, and combination locks—into guns.”42 Regarding 
youth suicides by gun, research indicates that suicide attempts correlate to 
firearm access; suicidal teens without a gun readily available usually do 
not simply find another means.43 For example, researchers have found that 
nine out of ten suicide attempts by firearm are fatal, but all other (non-
firearm) suicide attempts are fatal only 8.5% of the time.44  
Devices that prevent the unauthorized use of firearms could 
potentially prevent criminal gangs and other unlawful possessors from 
using them as trafficked or diverted weapons.45 A personalized smart gun 
would be unusable when stolen, which over time could reduce the number 
 
36. See Teret, supra note 9, at 25; see also Smart Guns, supra note 27.  
37. See HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 138 (“Some manufacturers are developing 
‘smart’ or ‘personalized’ guns that cannot be fired except by authorized users. These guns 
can help prevent unintentional injury to children and adolescents as well as the criminal 
use of stolen guns (which will also reduce the likelihood of firearm theft).”). 
38. Gun Violence Statistics, supra note 33. 
39. Smart Guns, supra note 27. 
40. See HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 33 (“Most shootings of younger children 
involve firearms belonging to parents and grandparents. Here, too, tragedies could be 
prevented . . . .”). 
41. See id. (“[C]hildren [are] finding improperly stored firearms and shooting 
themselves or other people or adolescents shooting each other when they believe guns to 
be unloaded – [Physicians] know that there are readily available technological solutions, 
such as childproof firearms, smart guns, and magazine safeties.”). 
42. Id. 
43. See Teret, supra note 9, at 24 (“Some skeptics might suggest that the absence of 
an operable gun would just cause a depressed teenager to find another means of suicide, 
but research shows that substitution or displacement of means of suicide frequently does 
not occur.”). 
44. See Andrew Conner et al., Suicide Case-Fatality Rates in the United States, 2007 
to 2014: A Nationwide Population-Based Study, 171 ANNALS  OF INTERNAL MED. __ (Dec. 
2019), available at https://bit.ly/3bMW921.  
45. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 82. 
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of stolen guns on the black market.46 Fewer black market guns should 
reduce the number of gun-related deaths and injuries that occur using 
stolen weapons.47 Firearms stolen from homes and cars (numbering in the 
hundreds of thousands per year) often go directly into the black market 
and become crime guns.48 Personalized smart guns would be inoperable 
by thieves or buyers on the black market, reducing the rate of gun crime 
resulting in death.49 
Legally, there are currently no federal regulations for firearm safety 
or design standards, except for the National Firearms Act ban on machine 
guns.50 In fact, a federal statute51 prohibits the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC), the unit of government that normally regulates 
safety for consumer items, from promulgating any rules or specifications 
for firearms or ammunition. This means there are no laws in place that 
incentivize gun manufacturers to develop or market smart guns. Three 
states—Maryland,52 Massachusetts,53 and New Jersey54—have statutes 
that address smart gun technology in some way, but none of these are 
regulatory mandates.55 Some academic commentators have called for a 
federal agency, whether a new bureau or a newly-authorized agency that 
already exists, to have the authority to regulate firearm safety, including 
making rules and giving grants to develop smart guns and foster their 
widespread adoption by consumers.56 “The agency should have the funds 
 
46. See id. at 138 (“These guns can help prevent unintentional injury to children and 
adolescents as well as the criminal use of stolen guns (which will also reduce the likelihood 
of firearm theft).”). 
47. See David Hemenway, Reducing Firearm Violence, 46 CRIME & JUST. 201, 211–
12 (2017) (“Personalized guns (also known as smart guns) make it more difficult for 
unauthorized people to use them. Having such guns rather than the normal firearm reduces 
the likelihood of accidents, suicides, and thefts. Personalized guns for police would stop 
criminals from seizing and using officers’ guns against them.”).  
48. See id.; see also Michael L. Rich, Limits on the Perfect Preventive State, 46 CONN. 
L. REV. 883, 890 (2014) (“The implementation of so-called ‘smart gun’ technologies, 
which make a gun capable of being fired only by its lawful owner, could make it so that 
many violent criminals would be unable to obtain a usable firearm.”). 
49. See Hemenway, supra note 47, at 211–12. 
50. See Smart Guns, supra note 27. 
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(ii)(E) (2018). 
52. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5–132 (West 2020); Philip J. Cook et al., 
Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1054 (2009) (“And the Maryland legislature recently adopted a 
pioneering requirement: All handguns manufactured after 2003 and sold in the state must 
be ‘personalized’ with a built-in locking device that requires a key or combination to 
release.”). 
53. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131K (2019). 
54. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-2.10, :58-2.7, :58-2.8, 2C:39-1dd (West 2020). 
55. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 117–18 for a detailed commentary on the statutes in 
these three states. 
56. See HEMENWAY, supra note 10, at 212–27. 
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to promote research on personalized or ‘smart guns’ and on less lethal 
ammunition and weapons,”57 contends David Hemenway. 
Personalized smart guns have two main types: (1) biometrics-based 
trigger locks (fingerprint or palm-grip readers, mostly); and (2) 
radiofrequency identification (“RFID”)-token trigger locks (which work 
only when the shooter is wearing an electronically matched ring, key fob, 
or pendant).58 These two lines of technology have advanced in other arenas 
in the last two decades and have become commonplace, but they have not 
caught on for guns, partly for market reasons and partly for legal-political 
reasons. A third but far less common version of this technology uses a PIN 
touchpad—the user types a three- or four-digit code into a keypad on the 
handle to enable the gun. Smart guns are, predictably, more expensive than 
their electronics-free counterparts.59 But this is mostly due to the lack of 
scaling in production (i.e., mass production). The technologies “work” in 
a general sense—personalized guns are available for purchase—but like 
most technology, they are not foolproof.60 Biometric guns may not work 
if the user wears gloves, as police often do,61 or if the user has dirty or 
sweaty hands, or simply because the device is buggy that day. RFID 
trigger locks may be unusable even by the owner if the paired token 
(usually a pendant or ring) happens to be in another location, or even 
another room.62 Both technologies present potential battery issues, and 
both are susceptible to (malicious) overrides or workarounds. RFID guns 
with longer range token capability could also be susceptible to 
sophisticated hackers.63   
 
57. Id. at 214. 
58. See Crepelle, supra note 14, at 254. 
59. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 83 (“In reality, the net effect on trafficking and 
unauthorized use depends on several factors, including the difficulty of circumventing or 
otherwise defeating the ECSMs, the security of tokens and PIN codes for token-based 
technologies, and the false positive rate of biometric technologies.”). 
60. See Michael Recce, Using Computer Technology to Increase Gun Safety, in 
PERSONALIZED FIREARMS AND ELECTRONIC SAFETY DEVICES: PERSPECTIVES 35, 37 (Small 
Arms Survey 2013); see also Crepelle, supra note 14, at 255 (“The even bigger concern, 
though, is the potential for the user recognition mechanism to fail and block the authorized 
user from firing the weapon at the crucial moment. Displaying a gun is often enough to 
stop an attacker, but threats are not always sufficient.”). 
61. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 128 (“Federal officers are often in situations where 
their fingerprint would be dirty or wet, and if this technology is implemented a firearm may 
not work when it is needed most . . . then they jeopardize the safety of the people they are 
meant to protect.”). 
62. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 110: 
In 2015, Mossberg, a leader in the market of firearms for home defense, released 
an RFID shotgun that can only be fired if the gun owner is wearing a ring. 
Mossberg says that his company, O.F. Mossberg & Sons, the oldest family 
owned gun company in the United States, is vigorously integrating the RFID 
technology under his authority in the name of safety for the gun owner. 
63. See Yu-Ju Tu & Selwyn Piramuthu, On Addressing RFID/NFC-Based Relay 
Attacks: An Overview, DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, Feb. 2020, at 1. 
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There are technological tradeoffs: biometric smart guns do not rely 
on radio signals and tokens, thereby eliminating the risk of hacking and 
misplacing the secondary token. But, at the same time, biometric readers 
present other reliability issues.64 The reliability of fingerprint scanners 
depends on “variables such as finger positioning, residue, gloves, 
moisture, and battery failure.”65 One solution to this issue is the use of 
dynamic grip recognition,66 rather than a fingerprint scanner. Dynamic 
grip recognition would work with gloves and relies on less expensive 
sensors, because it measures relative pressure at numerous points from the 
person’s grip, rather than reading grooves on the surface of the skin (like 
a fingerprint reader).   
 Battery life could see improvement with newer prototypes that use 
the internal batteries only when the trigger is pulled.67 Growth in the 
personalized electronics industry continues to reduce the cost and power 
consumption associated with these small electronics.68 Some still express 
concerns that a smart gun may nonetheless be left in its “locked” setting if 
the battery fails, potentially leaving them defenseless in an emergency.69 
In the long run, smart guns may need to have a design feature that makes 
the gun default to a traditional, workable firearm whenever the electronics 
fail. 
Biometric sensors, such as fingerprint and palmprint scanners, are the 
most common type of biometric ECSMs, but emerging technological 
variations include grip, voice, facial recognition, and even skin 
spectroscopy.70 Biometrics can be physical or behavioral. Physical 
biometrics are some unique properties of the authorized user, such as their 
“fingerprints, DNA, iris patterns, or facial features.”71 Alternatively, 
behavioral biometrics are unique properties of an individual’s behavior, 
like the characteristics of their voice or grip.   
RFID, on the other hand, requires an external device for operation.72 
The token or key in an RFID is often a wearable device containing tiny 
 
64. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 86 (“Concerns about the maturity and reliability 
of new technologies also explain why some individuals and institutions are reluctant to 
adopt them, particularly ECSMs. There are fears that adverse physical conditions, battery 
failure, electromagnetic interference, or sabotage could render the devices inoperable 
during an armed engagement.”); see also Hemenway, supra note 47, at 212. 
65. 5 Things to Know About Smart Guns, POLICEONE (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://bit.ly/2UlIb1O.  
66. See Crepelle, supra note 14, at 254. 
67. See 5 Things to Know About Smart Guns, supra note 65. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. 
70. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 82. 
71. Caitlin Hoffman, Survey: Most Gun Owners Support Sale of ‘Smart’ Guns But 
Aren’t Likely to Buy Them, HUB (June 10, 2019) https://bit.ly/3aK3Kim.  
72. See Schroeder, supra note 3, at 83 (“Token-based technologies differ from 
biometric technologies in that the device that enables the weapon is contained in a separate 
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electromagnetic transmitters, like a bracelet or ring, that emits a signal that 
unlocks the gun.73 The token or key must be near the gun to unlock it. 
RFID is already commonly in use for “allowing for controlled building 
access, vehicle parking access, and library book theft prevention, among 
many other uses.”74  
LodeStar, a newer smart gun startup, chose to use RFID technology 
instead of fingerprint readers, as it explains on its website: “RFID is a 
proven, reliable approach and involves a simple “digital handshake” 
across a narrow gap between a small digital chip worn by the owner (e.g., 
embedded in a ring or wristband) and another chip embedded in the 
firearm.”75 LodeStar claims that smart guns could reduce gun deaths by 
25%, that is, saving 100,000 lives per decade.76 Like other proponents, the 
company contends that smart guns could reduce child gun accidents that 
occur when children find and play with their parents’ guns, could prevent 
teenagers from using parents’ guns in school shootings, would be unusable 
as crime guns if stolen, and would reduce suicides by those who have 
access to a friend or relative’s guns.77 Some earlier academic studies 
suggest similar conclusions. One oft-cited article from the early 2000s 
analyzed a sample of unintentional and undetermined firearm deaths and 
concluded that 37% of these deaths would not have occurred if the 
firearms involved had been smart guns.78 The simplicity of RFID devices 
makes them overall less susceptible to user error. Nevertheless, the 
authorized user would be responsible for two devices, the firearm and the 
token. A gun owner may misplace the token, making it unavailable in an 
emergency. Alternatively, a gun owner may be inclined to store the token 
and the weapon together, rendering it “active” and negating the safety 
benefits.  Additionally, RFID devices are susceptible to electromagnetic 
interference.   
 
object, or token, which may or may not be personalized. Most token-based ECSMs employ 
RFID technology, consisting of an RFID reader and tag.”).  
73. See id. (“The reader is typically installed in the firearm and the tag is placed in 
the token, which takes many forms, including rings, gloves, wristbands, and wrist 
watches.”); see also Recce, supra note 60, at 38–39.   
74. Teret, supra note 9, at 29.   
75. See LODESTAR, https://bit.ly/3aImmiR (last visited May 19, 2020). LodeStar 
claims its company “is by far the most ambitious developer of smart guns and is working 
with German developers to have a 9mm RFID smart gun prototype available in the spring 
of 2019 and available for marketplace availability later in 2020.” Id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See Jon S. Vernick et al., Unintentional and Undetermined Firearm Related 
Deaths: A Preventable Death Analysis for Three Safety Devices, 9 INJURY PREV. 307, 308 
(2003). 
2020 SMART GUNS, THE LAW, AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 705 
B. A History of Missteps 
Thorny legal and political issues have beset smart gun technology 
since its inception.79 Smart guns saw an initial phase of interest, 
investment, and then fizzled-out in the 1990s and early 2000s, and then 
another wave of interest, investment, and fizzle-out after the horrific 
elementary school massacre in Newtown, CT.80 The Clinton81 and 
Obama82 Administrations each tried to encourage, or even force, the 
development of smart guns—again, spurring initial interest that petered 
out soon thereafter. In the Clinton years, the National Institutes of Justice 
(with Congressional support) provided grants to some gun manufacturers 
and the New Jersey Institute of Technology for research on smart gun 
technology to prevent unauthorized use of police-issued handguns.83 By 
the end of the 1990s, Colt Industries had completed the Z40, a new type 
of pistol that included an RFID chip and worked with a matching 
wristband.84 This development proved so controversial among gun-rights 
advocates that Colt abandoned the project abruptly.85   
Initial research into smart gun technology resulted from grants 
offered by the U.S. government to gun manufacturers in the mid-1990s 
and early 2000s.86 In May 2000, President Clinton announced a grant of 
$300,000 to Smith & Wesson (“S&W”) to support research into smart gun 
technologies and the development of smart gun prototypes.87 At the time, 
 
79. See Steven P. Teret & Adam D. Mernit, Personalized Guns: Using Technology 
to Save Lives, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: INFORMING POL’Y WITH EVIDENCE 
AND ANALYSIS 174–81 (Daniel W. Webster & Jon S. Vernick eds., 2013). 
80. See Smart Guns, supra note 27. 
81. See James B. Jacobs, Zimring/Hawkins Citizen’s Guide to Gun Control: A 
Retrospective, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 89 (2018) (“The Clinton Administration joined 
the lawsuit and, in 2000, negotiated a settlement with Smith & Wesson, under which the 
company promised . . . to invest in research on ‘smart-gun technology’ so that a gun could 
only be fired by the persons to whom it had been programmed.”).  
82. See Obama, supra note 14, at 857–58. 
83. See Nancy Rodriguez, Strengthening Justice in the U.S.: The Impact of Scientific 
Research, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 299–300 (2016) (“NIJ is holding a Gun Safety 
Technology Challenge to conduct an objective demonstration through testing and 
evaluation of the reliability of firearms and firearm accessories available today that are 
typically known by various terms such as smart guns, user-authorized handguns, childproof 
guns, and personalized firearms.”). 
84. See Lacey Nicole Wallace, American Preferences for “Smart” Guns Versus 
Traditional Weapons: Results from a Nationwide Survey, 4 PREV. MED. REP. 11, 12 (2016). 
The Colt Z40 is like the current Armatrix smart gun models. See id.  
85. See Sophia Agathis, Private Equity’s Overleveraging of Portfolio Companies, 21 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 629 (2016) (discussing Colt’s financial troubles and 
relationships with investors in the wake of its smart gun debacle). 
86. See SMALL ARMS SURVEY, PERSONALIZED FIREARMS AND ELECTRONIC SAFETY 
DEVICES: PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 (2013). 
87. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Clinton Admin. 
Reaches Historic Agreement with Smith and Wesson, (Mar. 17, 2000) (on file with author); 
see also Daniel P. Rosner, In Guns We Entrust: Targeting Negligent Firearms Distribution, 
11 DREXEL L. REV. 421, 439 (2018) (“With respect to manufacturing, Smith & Wesson 
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S&W was being sued by various levels of the U.S. government for “not 
taking adequate care in their distribution systems to keep guns out of the 
hands of criminals . . . [and not] designing their guns as safely as was 
feasible.”88 S&W accepted the grant and agreed to make changes to the 
design of its guns to settle the lawsuits against it.89 Contemporaneously, in 
the late 1990s, researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and 
Research published A Model Handgun Safety Standard Act (Model Act),90 
which proposed a statutory mandate that licensed firearm dealers could 
sell only personalized smart guns once such guns were available on the 
retail market.91 Based on the Model Handgun Safety Standard Act, which 
recommended that state governments establish performance standards for 
all newly manufactured handguns,92 New Jersey enacted the New Jersey 
Childproof Handgun Law.93 The law mandated that, three years after smart 
guns were commercially available in the state, only smart guns could be 
sold. This legislative action merely confirmed the fears of many gun-rights 
groups that the availability of smart gun technology would result in state 
and federal mandates prohibiting the manufacture, and eventually the 
ownership, of traditional guns. Critics, such as the National Rifle 
Association (“NRA”), argued that such legislation would effectively be a 
handgun ban, which would implicate Second Amendment rights.94 Even 
today, smart gun advocates consider the New Jersey bill “a debilitating 
blow for the smart gun movement” because it virtually halted all 
development in smart technology in the U.S.95 S&W was in the process of 
developing a product to bring to market, and the New Jersey enactment 
prompted the NRA to call for the boycott of S&W, and as a result, the 
company temporarily closed two factories and ultimately laid off 125 
 
agreed to implement safety features—such as child proof handguns, locking devices, and 
chamber load indicators—that would mitigate the risk of accidental shootings. Other 
measures included promises to invest resources into researching and developing smart gun 
technology that would enhance firearm safety.”). 
88. Teret, supra note 9, at 29–30. 
89. See id.  
90. See SUSAN DEFRANCESCO ET AL., A MODEL HANDGUN SAFETY STANDARD ACT 
(2d ed. 1998). All the authors of the Model Act have a J.D. and an M.P.H. See id.  
91. For pre-Heller unfavorable discussion of the proposed mandate, see generally 
Cynthia Leonardatos et al., Smart Guns/Foolish Legislators: Finding the Right Public 
Safety Laws, And Avoiding the Wrong Ones, 34 CONN. L. REV. 157 (2001) (criticizing 
proposed mandate). 
92. See Teret, supra note 9, at 28. 
93. See Cody J. Jacobs, End the Popularity Contest: A Proposal for Second 
Amendment “Type Of Weapon” Analysis, 83 TENN. L. REV. 231, 269 (2015) (“A more 
ambitious law in New Jersey will require all handguns that are sold after a certain date to 
be equipped with ‘smart gun’ or ‘owner authorization’ technology that allows the gun only 
to be fired by its authorized owner, once such technology is available.”). 
94. For legal commentary arguing along these lines, see Lujan, supra note 14, at 501–
10; see also Murphy Signs Bill Aimed at Making Smart Guns Available, U.S. NEWS (July 
16, 2019), https://bit.ly/2UrOVeB; Charles, supra note 14, at 1176. 
95. See Metzler, supra note 2, at 118.  
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employees.96 The boycott was successful, financially crippling for S&W, 
who abandoned the product. By the following year, Tompkins, the 
company that bought S&W for $112 million 14 years prior, sold it for $15 
million, plus debt absorption.97 
Around the same time, smart guns appeared in a wave of reformist-
minded litigation against firearm manufacturers98—also trying to make 
smart guns mandatory—but through tort liability-based duties rather than 
through statute. Municipalities, states, nonprofit organizations, and some 
individual plaintiffs brought (largely unsuccessful) public nuisance claims 
against gun makers over the widespread violence that resulted from their 
products. Many of these claims included an assertion that gun makers had 
a duty to produce firearms with better safety features, i.e., smart guns.99 
The attempt to mandate personalized smart guns through litigation proved 
unsuccessful in case after case, but these cases were part of the larger 
litigation trend that prompted Congress to enact a federal statute, the 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”)100, shielding 
gun manufacturers from liability in such cases—that is, providing 
immunity to tort actions. The PLCAA blocked subsequent litigation 
attempts to compel gun manufacturers to develop and market personalized 
guns.101 However, a 2019 decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals may 
 
96. See Roger Parloff, Smart Guns: They’re Ready. Are We?, FORTUNE (Apr. 22, 
2015), https://bit.ly/2UnGTDA. 
97. See id. 
98. For an overview, see City Cases, BRADY UNITED (2019), https://bit.ly/3bz4sz6. 
99. See, e.g., People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc., No. 4095, 2003 WL 21184117, 
at *4 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2003) (“According to defendants, the gist of 
plaintiffs’ design claims is that defendants have engaged in unfair business practices and 
created a public nuisance by failing to incorporate certain design features into their 
respective firearms—such as magazine disconnect safeties, chamber-loaded indicators, and 
‘personalized gun’ or ‘unauthorized user’ technology, including integral locks. Defendants 
submit that causation is also an essential element of these claims.”); NAACP v. A.A. Arms, 
Inc., Nos. 99 CV 3999, 99 CV 7037, 2003 WL 2003788, at *1–*3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2003); 
Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 792 A.2d 1145, 1148 (Md. 2002) (“Petitioner alleged 
. . . personalized gun technology that would have substantially reduced the likelihood that 
a child could fire the gun . . . .”); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass.L.Rptr. 
225 (July 13, 2000) (“Plaintiffs [unsuccessfully] claim that failure to incorporate 
‘personalized’ gun technology (to prevent unauthorized or prohibited persons from 
obtaining access to and using guns) results in homicides and other crimes, some of which 
occur in Boston . . . Defendants are in the best position to conduct research to correct the 
design of their guns.”); Whitfield v. Heckler & Koch Co., No. EC023122, 1998 WL 
1769748, at *19 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 1998) (“‘At this point in time, no 
electronic “Smart Gun” technology has been demonstrated which would be effective 
enough to be commercially viable.’”). 
100. See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 
(2018). 
101. See Adames v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742, 750–51 (Ill. 2009) (claim against 
manufacturer was barred by Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act); see also Cody 
J. Jacobs, The Second Amendment and Private Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 986 (2017) 
(discussing liability-based duties for firearm manufacturers to include smart gun safety 
technology but conceding, “[t]he ability to bring suits under these kinds of theories has 
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have revived one part of this litigation under an exception in the 
PLCAA.102 
A similar story unfolded again in the Obama years, in the wake of the 
Newtown atrocity.103 A directive from President Obama led the 
Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security in 2016 to issue 
a report that concluded gun manufacturers need government financial 
incentives or mandates to develop smart gun technology and bring it to 
market.104 The Report proposed a plan to form partnerships between the 
federal government and state and local law enforcement agencies to 
“establish the specific conditions under which they would consider 
purchasing firearms with advanced gun safety technology.”105 A few 
months later, in November 2016, the Obama Administration published 
baseline specifications for police service pistols, which included smart gun 
personalization technology.106 One RFID smart gun, the Armatix iP1, was 
briefly planned to be offered at stores in the U.S. but was ultimately 
withdrawn in the wake of death threats and violent intimidation against 
gun dealers by gun owners.107 Gun rights advocates feared its introduction 
into the American market would trigger the New Jersey Childproof 
 
been severely limited by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act 
(PLCAA), which immunizes gun manufacturers from suits relating to the ‘criminal or 
unlawful misuse’ of their products.”). 
102. See City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 126 N.E.3d 813, 823–34 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2019); see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Torts and Guns, 10 J. TORT L. 3, 6 n.15 (2017) 
(explaining that a “design defect” claim based on the duty to incorporate smart gun 
technology as a child safety feature would not fall under the PLCAA, but a claim for 
criminal homicides that would not have occurred if the weapons were smart guns would 
come under the statute). 
103. See, e.g., Lujan, supra note 14, at 502. 
104. See DEP’TS. OF DEF., JUSTICE, & HOMELAND SEC., Report to the President 
Outlining a Strategy to Expedite Deployment of Gun Safety Technology (April 2016), 
available at https://bit.ly/2wI9Qko [hereinafter Gun Safety Technology Report]; see also 
Allen Rostron, A New State Ice Age for Gun Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 338 
(2016) (“Suggesting that federal purchasing power could be a lever to encourage 
development of new safety innovations, the Obama administration directed federal 
agencies ‘to review the availability of smart gun technology on a regular basis’ and ‘to 
consider whether including such technology in specifications for acquisition of firearms 
would be consistent with operational needs.’”). 
105. See Gun Safety Technology Report, supra note 104. 
106. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250377, BASELINE 
SPECIFICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICE PISTOLS WITH SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 
(2016). 
107. See Michael S. Rosenwald, Maryland Dealer, Under Pressure from Gun-Rights 
Activists, Drops Plan to Sell Smart Gun, WASH. POST (May 2, 2014), 
https://wapo.st/2J7v3a7; see also Schroeder, supra note 3, at 87 (“Fire-arms retailers in 
California and Maryland stopped selling the Armatix iP1 after receiving threats of physical 
violence and store boycotts from gun rights advocates, who feared that sale of ECSM-
equipped handguns would lead to a ban on their conventional counterparts.”). 
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Handgun Law.108 “In the ensuing uproar, [some] went so far as to threaten 
stores that attempted to stock the IP1.”109  
Soon thereafter, a hobbyist-hacker posted a video online showing that 
the Armatix iP1 smart gun was easy to hack in three different ways, often 
using technology that costs $20 or less.110 The hacker intercepted and 
diverted the RFID control with a radio device, used the radio signal to jam 
the RFID signal so the gun could not fire, and used inexpensive magnets 
placed on the gun to override the RFID trigger lock, so the gun would fire 
without it.111 The video was devastating for Armatix. 
C. Policy Objections and Consumer Reluctance 
The NRA112 and other gun rights advocates113 question whether smart 
guns would have any sort of meaningful effect on suicide, homicide, and 
unintentional injuries. Some point out that smart guns would do little to 
address adult suicide—the leading cause of firearm death.114 Others argue 
that smart guns would do little to reduce the risk of accidental discharges 
by children in homes for three reasons.115 First, research shows that the 
gun owners who reported being likely to purchase a smart gun already 
engaged in safe gun storage behaviors.116 Second, they contend that, 
because most gun owners own multiple firearms, most households would 
still have traditional firearms in addition to any newly purchased smart 
gun. The presence of a smart gun, therefore, would not keep a child from 
 
108. See Rosenwald, supra note 107; see also Charles, supra note 14, at 1176 (“Thus, 
when Rockville, Maryland gun store owner Andy Raymond sought to become the nation’s 
first smart gun dealer, gun rights activists responded fervently. Not only did gun rights 
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accessing one of the traditional guns.117 Finally, they point out that smart 
guns would do nothing to curtail homicides committed by an individual 
using their own gun. Even the Violence Policy Center (“VPC”), a gun 
control advocacy group, has alternated between criticism, skepticism, and 
agnosticism about smart guns118—partly because the VPC thinks that 
smart guns might appeal to people who currently would not own a firearm 
due to safety concerns, so that the overall number of guns in circulation 
increases enough to offset any reduction in injuries from the safety 
features.119 Proponents, however, answer that this would be true for any 
safety or health device, but in the end it is better to have safer devices on 
the market than unsafe devices, even if the devices become more common 
in the process.120  
Adverse selection effects among gun purchasers could cancel out the 
anti-theft and anti-accident benefits of smart guns. The gun purchasers 
most likely to have their guns stolen or misused by unsupervised children 
are the least likely to buy personalized smart guns, and those at the least 
risk of such outcomes are also the most likely to buy smart guns but receive 
little additional benefit from the purchase.  
Even if gun owners traded in their traditional handgun when 
purchasing a smart gun, critics maintain that “the introduction of 
personalized guns could greatly increase the lethality of the country’s 
privately held gun stock” because newer firearms are “primarily high-
capacity, higher caliber pistols with magazines with a capacity that can 
range up to more than 30 rounds.”121 It is important to note, nonetheless, 
that currently available models are associated with lower firepower.122 The 
iP1, for instance, uses .22 rounds.123 For gun buyers focused on self-
defense, they may imagine dramatic life-or-death scenarios where they 
draw the gun and fire fast enough to subdue a would-be assailant. For this 
imagined scenario, each second counts because even a slight risk of 
malfunction or delayed firing seems unacceptable, and low firepower is 
unappealing. The limited product selection for consumers (gun 
purchasers) is also a factor suppressing the adoption of personalized guns. 
 
117. See VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., supra note 35. According to the 2004 National 
Firearms Survey, 48% percent of all individual gun owners and 41% of gun-owning 
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118. See id. 
119. See id. 
120. Teret, supra note 9, at 24–25. 
121. VIOLENCE POL’Y CTR., supra note 35. For a thorough discussion of lethality and 
non-lethal alternatives in the Second Amendment context, see Blocher & Miller, Lethality, 
supra note 21, at 294–300. 
122. See 5 Things to Know About Smart Guns, supra note 65. 
123. See id. 
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Each company has one or two models available, and gun purchasers are 
accustomed to an enormous range of options when buying.124   
Personalization features could also reduce the expected resale value 
of the gun, which in turn reduces the value or appeal of the gun to a 
prospective purchaser. A used or preowned gun with a biometric trigger 
lock would need resetting to remove the seller as a designated user and to 
add the new buyer instead. Even though the smart gun manufacturers 
claim this is an easy thing to do, it is still a transaction cost that we would 
expect to affect resale prices. Moreover, the easier it is to reassign the 
authorized user, the easier it is for thieves or children to gain access as 
well. Compounding the potentially lower expected resale value of the gun 
is the current elevated price that results from the lack of economies of scale 
(not enough personalized smart guns are made and sold to capture 
economies of mass production). As small arms analyst Matthew Schroeder 
explains, 
Cost may also limit sales of firearms equipped with ECSMs, including 
to government agencies. The Armatix iP1 pistol and accompanying 
wristwatch cost USD 1,798 - considerably more than most 
conventional pistols on the market, including the models commonly 
procured by security agencies. The unit cost for large orders of iP1 
pistols would be lower than the retail price for individual units, but it 
is unclear whether, and at what point, these economies of scale would 
make ECSM-equipped firearms competitive with their conventional 
counterparts in terms of price.125 
Surveys indicate that if the safety features added $300 to the original 
price, only 18% of gun owners reported being likely to purchase a smart 
gun. Overall, 56% of respondents had concerns about the additional cost 
associated with smart gun technology and 70% were concerned about the 
technology working properly when needed.126  
A more subtle price effect, impossible to quantify, is the reverse price 
effects of the black market on the gray (mostly legal) secondary market. 
Suppose that 10–15% of the guns that pass through the secondary (used 
gun) market eventually end up in a sale to a prohibited person or a 
permissible purchaser to commit crimes. If smart guns have zero market 
value for those eventual purchasers, this limits the pool of prospective 
future purchasers, and hence suppresses the expected resale value. 
Following this series of last antecedents, the original retail purchaser, even 
if she would never sell to anyone except a lawful purchaser who was also 
a friend or relative, still has a lower expected resale price when purchasing 
a gun from a licensed firearm dealer. The manufacturer’s suggested retail 
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price may not account for this black-market after-effect, in which case the 
guns will seem overpriced even for their novel features. In addition, note 
that gun owners do not need to fear liability for what happens when their 
guns are stolen, even if the owner negligently leaves the gun in a location 
where it is easy prey for thieves.127 
D.  The Unflagging Proponents  
Everytown for Gun Safety128 (“Everytown”) has called on the major 
firearms manufacturers to develop and market smart guns: “[S]afety 
mechanisms built into the firearm itself can be more effective at preventing 
unauthorized access to and unintentional discharge of firearms. Lost or 
stolen guns could be easily located by their owners if firearms were 
equipped with readily available technology.”129 Everytown proposes 
several tech improvements: “authorized-use technology, like the thumb 
scan or passcode available on many smartphones; loaded chamber 
indicators that show when there is a cartridge in the chamber . . . and 
tracking sensors to allow the authorized user to find the location of a 
firearm, like the ‘find my phone’ feature . . . .”130   
The Giffords Law Center also advocates for the adoption of smart 
gun technology,131 noting that surveys suggest there would be a viable 
market, and that some gun owners would prefer them, even if many object 
to a ban on traditional firearms being part of the policy package.132 For 
example, a 2019 survey study found that 79% of gun owners say that gun 
stores should sell both traditional and personalized smart guns.133 In 
another study, most of the survey respondents who are not currently gun 
owners (~63% of this group) were willing to consider buying a 
personalized smart gun if they were to buy a gun in the next year.134 
Similarly, a study in 2016 found that: 
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[A]mong non-owners, older respondents and those with pro-gun 
attitudes are less likely to prefer smart guns to traditional firearms. 
Among gun owners, those with moderate political views, those with a 
history of victimization, and those residing in the Northeast are all 
more likely to prefer smart guns. Males and those with progun attitudes 
are less likely to prefer smart guns. Education, income, race, marital 
status, presence of children in the home, and comfort discussing gun 
ownership with a doctor had no significant association with smart gun 
preference.135 
Researchers at Johns Hopkins never backed away from the proposed 
statutory mandate they proposed in the late 1990s.136 As Stephen Teret 
explained in 2013, the industry has no incentive to develop and market the 
product, and consumer demand is not strong enough to force a change 
through normal market pressures.137  
Even though smart gun critics argue that legislation restricting the 
sale of handguns to smart guns would effectively create an 
unconstitutional handgun ban, advocates argue it is a reasonable 
restriction, permissible under the Constitution.138 Whether such a mandate 
would survive a Second Amendment challenge is a hotly contested 
question in academic literature.139 The most plausible view was expressed 
by Tyler J. Kimberly, in a 2014 law review article: 
Even if smart guns impose some sort of “who” restriction, a federal 
court would likely uphold the restriction. First, whatever burden a 
court found likely would be minimal. In Chovan, the restriction was 
within the scope of the Second Amendment because 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9) placed a life ban on a class that historically had the right to 
bear arms for self-defense . . . . Second Amendment rights have been 
highly regarded and disputed, and the onset of new technology 
associated with those rights will not be any different. Concerns 
regarding smart-gun technology are understandable, but as this 
Comment demonstrated, there is not yet a constitutional basis for 
objecting to [a] smart-guns-only regime.140 
Another category of supporters for personalized smart guns is private 
funding providers. The leading example is the Smart Tech Challenges 
Foundation,141 a grantmaking nonprofit that provides private funds for 
smart gun startups whose product is in the development stage. The Smart 
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Tech Challenges Foundation launched in 2014 with the mission of 
reducing gun violence through technological innovation.142 In its first year, 
it granted $1 million to 15 innovator-entrepreneurs to develop products 
ranging from RFID and biometric personalized smart guns to biometric 
attachments for existing firearms (trigger locks, pistol holsters/holders, 
and gun barrel locks).143 The grant recipients form a type of industry 
community (the Foundation describes them as an “ecosystem”) that are 
part competitors, part compatriots in a cause.144 Most have not brought 
products to market yet, so they are not truly market rivals, though some 
are working on similar technologies (slightly different versions of 
biometric readers, for example) that could eventually compete, or are in a 
race to complete product development. Biofire,145 Identilock,146 Vara 
Safety,147 and Gun Guardian are all biometric safety devices (some are 
guns with the feature built-in, others are attachments that would work with 
existing pistols). These companies stand alongside more established 
companies Armatix148 and iGun,149 which use RFID technology to 
accomplish the same goal. 
 Personalized smart guns have enough political appeal that some 
presidential candidates have included it in their campaign talking points or 
policy agenda. For example, Joe Biden, when running for the 2020 
Democratic Party nomination, took the position that “we should work to 
eventually require that 100% of firearms sold in the U.S. are smart 
guns.”150 Product requirements are common in most consumer items, 
ranging from automobile airbags to lawnmowers. As already discussed, 
gun enthusiasts view smart gun mandates as a ban on the sale of the 
weapons that are currently popular (millions sold per year), meaning there 
is considerable political opposition to a new-sales mandate (what Biden 
calls a “requirement”). Constitutionally, under the Second Amendment, 
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the viability of such a mandate is also a little uncertain.151 Up to now, the 
Supreme Court has upheld bans on certain types of guns (machine guns 
and short-barrel shotguns) under the National Firearms Act, and the 
majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller emphasized, albeit in 
dicta, that restrictions on certain types of firearms could remain in place.152 
Circuit courts up to now have generally upheld state bans on 
semiautomatic assault rifles and large-capacity magazines. But several of 
these cases have pending certiorari petitions at the Supreme Court, and it 
is not clear which way the Court would rule given the personnel changes 
on the Court since Heller.153 If the existing stock of traditional (non-
personalized) guns continued to be legal—including private sales of these 
used guns—a requirement that new guns be a certain type would pose less 
of a potential infringement on individual’s Second Amendment rights 
than, say, an outright ban on all guns except smart guns, which is 
politically unrealistic in any case. In addition, given the Court’s emphasis 
in Heller on personal self-defense,154 the reliability of personalized smart 
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guns for self-defense, at the time such a requirement would go into effect, 
would, in turn, be a factor in assessing the constitutionality of such a 
mandate. At the same time, it would be a completely novel holding for a 
court to constitutionally require some degree of reliability in unplanned 
emergencies (self-defense), such as one hundred or even ninety percent. 
Recent commentators note that currently, “smart gun manufacturers claim 
smart guns have an expected failure rate of less than one in 10,000.”155 
A separate constitutional question is whether a state or federal 
government could limit the public carrying of firearms (whether open or 
concealed) to personalized smart guns, even if traditional firearms 
remained legal for home defense.156 Professor Timothy Zick recently 
suggested this and avers that it would pass muster under certain 
understandings of the Second Amendment.157 
Military and police are often the trendsetters for adopting new styles 
or types of firearms—gun makers advertise products to the civilian market 
as the same guns used by the Army, Marines, or major urban police 
departments. Adoption by the military and police would help foster 
consumer appeal for smart guns. I believe that personalized gun 
technology will not catch on until the military and police completely 
switch over to it. This would be an easier policy move, from a legal 
standpoint, than forcing the consumer market to switch first. Elected 
officials have a lot of control over military and police equipment purchases 
and upgrade policies. Here, however, is another problem: “the 
conservative nature of military and law-enforcement agencies and the 
historically slow pace of change in firearms technology.”158 As one 
firearms industry insider put it, “‘[w]e are working in a field where there 
has been little significant technological innovation in 120 years.’”159  
Regarding product development and improvement, a recent working 
paper published online by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
demonstrates a significant “crowding-in” phenomenon for defense 
spending on R&D—increases in government spending on R&D for a 
specific industry or item result in significant corresponding R&D in the 
private sector for the same industry or item.160 Each 10% increase in 
defense spending on R&D generates at least a 4% increase (or more) in 
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corresponding private sector R&D.161 But given the relative size of each 
sector, this implies that a $1 increase in defense spending on R&D 
generates a $5 increase in corresponding private-firm spending on 
R&D.162 This is not merely due to an increase in wages for personnel in 
that research sector, as a result of increased demand due to defense-sector 
hiring.163 It is possible, of course, that some of this “crowding-in” is due 
to private firms obtaining defense contracts and then subcontracting the 
R&D for specialized components to other firms in the relevant industry. 
Another factor could be that defense spending on a certain type of weapon 
signals the firms in that sector that new contracts or Calls for Proposals 
(CFPs) for research or production will be forthcoming. Moreover, if one 
firm—say, an arms manufacturer—secures a defense contract for R&D, 
rival firms in the industry may commence a race to secure patents in the 
area. Of course, a government/military CFP or bidding competition for an 
R&D contract can mean that several rival firms simultaneously develop a 
proof-of-concept model for their bid, and even after the military awards 
the contract to one firm, the others may decide to continue developing their 
own product for the civilian market, given their existing investment in the 
technology. In any case, “government-funded R&D in general - and 
defense R&D in particular - are effective at raising a country’s total 
expenditures on innovation in a given industry.”164 As a policy matter, 
spending on military R&D will probably be the most effective means to 
perfect the technology for personalized smart guns. 
Another factor that might spur the adoption of personalized gun 
technology includes repackaging it as an accessory attachment for existing 
firearms, rather than manufacturing and selling a special type of gun. This 
is the approach of Kodiak Arms with its Intelligun,165 which makes a $400 
fingerprint-reader handgrip replacement for the super-popular 1911-style 
semiautomatic pistol.166 There are millions of 1911 pistols in circulation, 
it was a longtime favorite of law enforcement and military service 
weapons in the twentieth century. More than one hundred manufacturers 
produce, or have produced, a version of this handgun. A smart gun 
conversion kit, like Intelligun, helps address the persistent problem (for 
smart gun advocates) of the existing stock of firearms in private hands. 
This kit also simultaneously helps address concerns by gun enthusiasts that 
smart guns will not work as a traditional firearm if the electronics fail, as 
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an owner could simply remove the grip attachment from her 1911 and 
restore it to its original state as a traditional handgun.167 In theory, this 
approach could potentially become much more popular. On the other hand, 
Intelligun includes an internal tracking/recording feature, discussed more 
below, that records the pinpoint GPS location, time of discharge, and other 
data every time the gun fires. Police unions have voiced opposition to 
Intelligun technology for their service weapons because of the heightened 
scrutiny or accountability it would provide after police shootings (similar 
to bodycams, but even more precise).168 
III. GUNS THAT CANNOT MISS (SEMI-AUTONOMOUS OR 
PRECISION-GUIDED FIREARMS) 
If the desire for gun safety or gun control has been driving the 
development of personalized smart gun technology, the desire for more 
lethality—a guaranteed kill—are driving the development of a different 
type of smart gun technology, precision-guided firearms that enable even 
a novice gun owner to shoot like a professional marksman or expert sniper. 
The military has developed and ordered sophisticated AWS for years, 
starting with the big guns on ships, tanks, and fighter jets.169 In recent 
years, small arms that incorporate this technology have appeared on the 
civilian market as well. TrackingPoint sells guns that do not miss.170 These 
guns can lock on a moving target, even in the dark, and hit it in the center 
of its mass. They can correct for wind, humidity, angle, spindrift, rifle cant, 
and the weight of the bullet. TrackingPoint’s most expensive models will 
lock on a target and hit it from 1400 yards. If the marketplace tells us 
anything, it is that gun purchasers are less interested in safety than in 
lethality, which is not terribly surprising. Of course, such weapons are 
especially appealing for military use,171 but they are already available for 
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the retail civilian market, though outside the price range of most gun 
purchasers.172 The legal issues presented by this technology partly overlap 
with those that surround personalized smart guns, but some distinct legal 
concerns also apply to partly autonomous guns that have extreme 
accuracy. The newness, high price, and (so far) scarcity of these weapons 
means they have received less attention in the legal academic literature up 
to now.  
The TrackingPoint rifle employs a laser rangefinder to measure the 
distance to the target and onboard electronics to measure incline/decline, 
air temperature, air density, barometric pressure, and target movement.173 
It also accounts for spindrift,174 the shooter’s cant,175 Magnus effect,176 and 
the Coriolis effect,177 caused by the Earth’s rotation. The rifle scope’s 
internal electronics already store data on the rifle’s own characteristics that 
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deflection is dependent on bullet length, flight time and, not surprisingly, spin 
rate. Its effect is noticeable, and must be taken into account, starting around 
500yds.  The metrics of spin drift vary widely, therefore it’s hard to account for 
the exact effect of spin drift on a bullet at extended ranges when shooting.  It’s 
an environmental hazard that only the most talented pros know how to 
compensate.  
Spin Drift, TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/3bLqQ81q (last visited May 19, 2020).   
175. Cant refers to the shooter’s unconscious propensity to tilt a gun at a slight angle 
or to pitch to one side:  
It is most commonly used to describe a situation where the shooter is positioned 
on a slope and the rifle is not held vertically true or straight up and down.  In 
other words, if you look through the riflescope, the horizontal crosswire is not 
level. Cant is not to be confused with line-of-sight (LOS), such as when you are 
shooting up or downhill. There are three types of cant rifle shooters must deal 
with: rifle cant, scope cant and reticle cant.  
Rifle Cant, TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/3bNb5h8 (last visited May 19, 2020). 
176. Magnus effect or “spin drift” comes into play because a bullet leaves the barrel 
of a gun twirling rapidly as it hurtles forward, and air flow interacts with the spin to nudge 
the trajectory off course: 
The Magnus effect is an observable phenomenon that is commonly associated 
with a spinning object that drags air faster around one side, creating a difference 
in pressure that moves it in the direction of the lower-pressure side. When 
shooting long range, the shooter must account for the distance the bullet will drift 
due to wind. All other things being equal, the bullet will hit a different place if 
the wind is coming 90 degrees from the left versus 90 degrees to the right. 
Magnus Effect, TRACKINGPOINT, https://bit.ly/2XbZdRG (last visited May 19, 2020). 
177. Coriolis effect “refers to the deflection on the trajectory of the bullet generated 
by the spinning motion of the Earth.” Coriolis Effect, TRACKINGPOINT, 
https://bit.ly/3bR9qXY (last visited May 19, 2020). At long distances, (1000 yards or 
more), it can affect the bullet on the horizontal and vertical planes of its trajectory. See id. 
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affect the bullet’s flight pattern, such as the ballistic coefficient, muzzle 
velocity, lock time, ignition time, and the direction of the barrel-rifling 
twist.178 The shooter pulls the trigger, but the rifle (or more properly, the 
smart scope) chooses the exact timing of the discharge to guarantee a hit 
in the center mass of the target.179 This weapon mostly eliminates operator 
error; allowing an inexperienced shooter to hit small targets ten football 
fields away.180 At the same time, the TrackingPoint rifle is not fully 
autonomous—it does not shoot unless someone pulls the trigger and 
initiates the sequence of instantaneous calculations and precision firing.181 
In military contexts, soldiers in the heat of battle could take out moving 
targets very quickly without perfectly maintaining the target in their 
sight.182  
TrackingPoint has a built-in Wi-Fi transmitter that streams live video 
and audio to a networked device, such as a smartphone or laptop.183 
Shooters can easily record shots and post the videos online, or they can 
live stream their shoots to social media sites.184 I will return to this 
technology later, when discussing recordkeeping guns, but for now, it is 
worth noting that a video live stream from a sniper rifle presents special 
advantages in military and law enforcement contexts, where an offsite 
command center could monitor everything and call the shots.185 Of course, 
there are nefarious uses for live streaming as well, as when terrorists or 
rampage shooters want to broadcast their atrocities to garner attention or 
notoriety.   
 It is easy to imagine military and law enforcement uses for 
precision-guided firearms.186 But TrackingPoint’s market now includes 
“safari enthusiasts, the outdoorsmen . . . even ranchers, folks that don’t 
have all day to run the fence line but need to take care of their predator 
population.”187 Of course, some hunters have been critical of the concept, 
arguing that it resembles the proverbial shooting fish in a barrel.188 It also 
 
178. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 49. 
179. See Dewey, supra note 16. 
180. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 49. 
181. See id. at 50. 
182. See id. at 223. 
183. See Dewey, supra note 16. 
184. See id.; see also MINITER, supra note 3, at 223–34.  
185. See Toscano, supra note 18, at 232. 
186. See Daniel Trotta, Gun with a Chip: U.S. Army Contracts May Lead to a Smarter 
Firearm, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2019, 6:33 AM), https://reut.rs/33Rrpe5.   
187. See Gassaway, supra note 17 (quoting Nelson Whiting, Vice President of 
Manufacturing at TrackingPoint). 
188. See Dewey, supra note 16 (“It’s the traditional shooting fish in a barrel or the 
sitting duck. I mean, there’s no skill in it, right? It’s just you point, you let the weapon 
system do its thing and you pull the trigger and now you’ve killed a deer. There’s no skill,” 
according to hunter Chris Wilbratte.); Peters, supra note 169 (“Any self-respecting hunter 
ought to be disgusted by something that promises to turn every hunt into a canned hunt.  
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seems to defeat the purpose of target practice, for those who enjoy that. 
For better or worse, however, leading gun experts say this is the future of 
firearms, or “where we’re going.”189 The manufacturer plans to repackage 
the technology as a scope that could attach to any firearm,190 so the 
millions of guns—any rifle or handgun large enough to hold a scope—that 
are already in private hands could become a precision-guided firearm. The 
greatest significance of these market disrupting new firearm technologies 
is working with the existing stock of traditional firearms, upgrading older 
guns into next-gen sophisticated firearms, and having the new high-tech 
guns also work as a traditional firearm if the electronics break or fail.   
The military wants guns like this but even better—they want the 
option to override the weapon from the command center if it were being 
misused, and operate the gun almost like a drone, or at least see exactly 
what the soldier is seeing through the scope.191 It would be useful for the 
military to be able to deactivate guns from a remote location if the soldier 
carrying it dies on the battlefield, or to have the ability to reassign the gun 
to another soldier in the same unit. In addition, when our troops withdrew 
recently and very abruptly from Syria, our military did not have time to 
pack up all their munitions, so they destroyed entire garages full of 
weapons lest ISIS seize them as soon as our forces withdrew.192 That 
happens more than most people think—battalions have to withdraw, 
retreat, or even charge forward and leave things behind and the Pentagon 
wants to be able to deactivate all the weapons until our forces (or allies) 
retrieve them.193   
One common theme in the legal issues surrounding these 
technologies is the internal turmoil, financial troubles, and resulting 
litigation that these companies face (though firm-level volatility may be a 
 
Despite the manufacturer’s claims, TrackingPoint really isn’t suited for target shooting—
where’s the fun in shooting at a target that you know you’re going to hit?”). 
189. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 221. 
190. See Gassaway, supra note 17 (“It will come in the package set to work. You just 
put it on your gun, zero it the same as you normally would zero any gun and it will do 
much of the rest, but with your own gun, you will not have trigger control.”) (quoting a 
TrackingPoint executive). 
191. See Daniel Trotta, Gun with a Chip: U.S. Army Contracts May Lead to a Smarter 
Firearm, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2019, 6:33 AM), https://reut.rs/33Rrpe5; Suciu, supra note 20.  
192. See Suciu, supra note 20 (“Depending on how the technologies were 
implemented, it might also lessen or eliminate the need to destroy facilities that were being 
abandoned – as recently occurred when U.S. soldiers withdrew from bases in Syria. 
Similarly, smart tech could reduce or eliminate the value of stolen military weapons.”). In 
addition, smart technology could alleviate legal implications of U.S. provided weapons 
being used against unintended targets, by providing military forces the ability to “disarm” 
weapons provided to resistance fighters, like the SDF in Syria. See Ellen Francis & Tom 
Perry, Syrian Kurds Outgunned but Vow to Inflict Toll on Turkish Army, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 
2019, 7:03 PM), https://reut.rs/3arZ80f.  
193. See, e.g., Pierre Bienaimé, How ‘Smart Guns’ Could Eventually Help Shape US 
Foreign Policy, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2015, 11:54 AM), https://bit.ly/2xz2lMF.  
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feature endemic to the firearms industry generally)194 at least in the United 
States. The discussion above,195 pertaining to personalized smart guns, 
mentioned the attendant financial problems, bankruptcy, and consumer 
boycotts for Colt and S&W, including the litigation between one of the 
lead inventors of the technology and the manufacturer. TrackingPoint had 
its share of troubles along these lines. After launching its product line in 
2013, TrackingPoint sold more than 1,000 of its expensive rifles within 
the first two years. But by 2015, the company was in trouble, and at one 
point laid off most of its employees and temporarily stopped taking 
orders.196 The company fired two of its high-profile executives, who 
promptly went to a competitor company and brought TrackingPoint’s 
innovative technology with them, which in turn resulted in litigation.197 In 
late 2018, Talon Precision Optics acquired TrackingPoint and took over 
its product line.198 Even so, TrackingPoint is currently selling its guns 
(with an expanded product line), introduced more affordable prices, and is 
obtaining new patents.199 News items and reviews from 2013 to 2015 
describe the price as being $25,000,200 but the prices have come down to 
feature an AR-15 model for around $7,000 on the company website—still 
pricey, but not too far afield from what other high-end assault rifles cost.201 
TrackingPoint even experienced an embarrassing hacker video,202 not 
unlike what happened to the Armatix RFID personalized gun—hackers 
 
194. See, e.g., Jesse Barron, How America’s Oldest Gun Maker Went Bankrupt: A 
Financial Engineering Mystery, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (May 1, 2019), 
https://nyti.ms/39l4JnC. Ironically, around the time Remington was going bankrupt, 
TrackingPoint had been counting on them either to acquire their company or pay a lucrative 
license for their technology. See id. 
195. See supra notes 83–97 and accompanying text.  
196. Colin Lecher, Under the Gun: How the Perfect Rifle Missed Its Target, VERGE 
(June 11, 2015, 11:25 AM), https://bit.ly/2WME7t7 (describing internal turmoil at the 
company in 2015, disgruntled employees, and dire financials). 
197. See generally TrackingPoint, Inc. v. Silencerco LLC, No. D-1-GN-15-004646, 
2015 WL 5968265 (Dist. Ct. Tex. October 13, 2015) (Trial Pleading). 
198. See Press Release, Talon Precision Optics, Talon Precision Optics, LLC 
Announces Asset Purchase in Precision-Guided Firearms and Advanced Optics 
Technologies (Dec. 21, 2018), https://prn.to/3bvjfL6.  
199. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Appl. Publ No. 2019/0243230 A1 (filed Aug. 20, 2018); 
U.S. Patent No. 10,337,830 B2 (filed Dec. 31, 2012).  
200. See, e.g., Toscano, supra note 18, at 232. 
201. See, e.g., Jared Keller, The Marine Corps’ New Rifle Is Super Expensive — And 
No One Knows Why, TASK & PURPOSE (Mar. 21, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://bit.ly/2WJSChi.  
202. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and 
Disposable Things, 17 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 581, 592 (2016) (including the rifles in a list of 
Internet-connected devices that are vulnerable to hackers); Andy Greenberg & Kim Zetter, 
How the Internet of Things Got Hacked, WIRED (Dec. 28, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
https://bit.ly/33LWobu (describing how certain hackers demonstrated to journalists that 
they could “control of a Wi-Fi-enabled TrackingPoint sniper rifle. Sandvik and Auger 
exploited the rifle’s insecure Wi-Fi to change variables in the gun’s self-aiming scope 
system, allowing them to disable the rifle, make it miss its target, or even make it hit a 
target of their choosing instead of the intended one.”); Andy Greenberg, Hackers Can 
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hijacked the electronics and manipulated the gun to hit the target to the left 
or right of the intended target. This proved less devastating for the 
company than the Armatix debacle—perhaps because the hackers in the 
video are well-known, elite hacker-researchers who give presentations at 
major tech conferences. It is not clear whether most hackers have the 
requisite expertise to do this, or that they would have the opportunity to be 
near one of these long-range safari-style guns when it is actually in use.   
As frightening as these weapons may seem to gun control 
advocates,203 as of yet there are no reported instances of TrackingPoint 
guns being used in crimes or shooting rampages. Despite the price drop, 
these rifles are still more expensive than most other guns—out of the price 
range for many adolescent gang members in poor neighborhoods and an 
unnecessary expense even for any criminal or terrorist organizations who 
could afford them. Additionally, the guns are enormous, not a convenient 
or useful tool for a close-encounter street robbery (especially if the 
perpetrator is on foot), or as a carry-along for a burglary. Sniper rifles in 
general are uncommon in homicides and interpersonal assaults—not a big 
contributor to crime rates overall or rates of shooting deaths specifically. 
Oversized, expensive, precision-guided hunting/sniper rifles are also an 
unlikely choice for impulsive homicides, such as domestic violence or 
suicide. Of course, if the predictions of experts come to fulfillment, this 
technology will become miniaturized, affordable, and attachable to any 
existing firearm, so the current natural limitations of size and price will 
erode over time. Moreover, the guns present some issues for certain types 
of crimes that can be very disruptive or destabilizing to society. Such 
disruptions include assassinations, whether sniper attacks on important 
public figures, or the drive-by shootings and targeted “hits” that are part 
of gang activity or street crime. Although less common than other types of 
homicides and assaults, assassinations can pose a special threat to 
democracy and culture—not only killings of elected officials, but leaders 
of social movements, important religious figures, and philanthropists. 
Similarly, there are unquantifiable economic ripple effects when violent 
attacks remove major financiers, technology innovators, or business 
leaders. Drive-by shootings in poor neighborhoods have a chilling effect 
on life in the public sphere, which can choke communities. Weapons 
optimized for targeted killings—of moving objects or from moving 
vehicles, from significant distances—pose special challenges for ensuring 
safety and security. They may thwart traditional security measures.   
 
Disable a Sniper Rifle—Or Change Its Target, WIRED (July 29, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
https://bit.ly/2Uz6cBq (“the researchers were able to dial in their changes to the scope’s 
targeting system so precisely that they could cause a bullet to hit a bullseye of the hacker’s 
choosing rather than the one chosen by the shooter.”). 
203. See MINITER, supra note 3, at 51; Tett, supra note 169 (expressing concerns that 
these weapons will fall into criminals’ hands). 
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Heightened lethality can have a ratchet effect—whatever level of 
lethality some “criminals” have in their weaponry, law enforcement and 
civilians wanting to stop criminals will demand the same firepower or 
lethal technology.204 If members of criminal enterprises expect to 
encounter certain types of armed resistance, they in turn are more likely to 
bring weapons to match it with equal force. An arms race is an inherent, 
unavoidable feature of any firearm technology that raises lethality. 
Banning precision-guided firearms is permissible under courts’ current 
Second Amendment analysis. The Heller decision left in place 
longstanding federal restrictions on machine guns and short-barrel rifles, 
and though nothing is certain with regards to the future of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence, a state or federal ban on Guns That Cannot 
Miss should fit into this constitutional niche. On the other hand, homicides 
with these weapons are likely to remain so rare for the near future, at least 
in comparison to other shootings, that there is unlikely to be voter demand 
for legislation tailored to these guns.   
The majority opinion in Heller repeatedly references the Second 
Amendment as a safeguard against government tyranny205—that is, an 
armed citizenry can resort to a violent revolt and overthrow an overbearing 
government. This is a favorite talking point for the NRA206 and Gun 
Owners of America207—that democratic freedoms and civil liberties 
depend on a fearsomely-armed private citizenry, and conversely, that gun 
control is historically a precursor to disarming the citizens to establish a 
dictatorship.208 I find these arguments disturbing—history seems instead 
to demonstrate that the most oppressive, bloodthirsty, genocidal regimes 
are those that take power by overthrowing the established government, 
even though they invariably claim to be liberators at the outset.209 
Nevertheless, the safeguard-against-tyranny point has traction in Second 
 
204. See Blocher & Miller, Lethality, supra note 21, at 289–90. 
205. See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008) (“Third, when the 
able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist 
tyranny.”); see id. at 600 (noting the need to “safeguard against tyranny”); see id. at 613 
(reiterating the “purpose of banding together to oppose tyranny”); see id. at 668 (“extolling 
the virtues of the militia as a bulwark against tyranny”).  
206. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n—Inst. for Legislative Action, NRA 
Slams Bernie Sanders’ Tyrannical Assault on American Gun Rights (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2yce4Bm; Press Release, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n—Inst. for Legislative Action, 65% 
See Gun Rights as Protection Against Tyranny (Jan. 18, 2013), https://bit.ly/2WHZ88l.  
207. See, e.g., Kurt Hofmann, ‘Gun Control’: The ‘Gateway Tyranny’, GUN OWNERS 
OF AM. (May 27, 2013), https://bit.ly/2QP0eeD.  
208. See, e.g., Robert Tracinski, How the Second Amendment Prevents Tyranny, 
FEDERALIST (Mar. 18, 2018), https://bit.ly/2WNGtrQ.  
209. See Casey Michel, The Myth That Civilian Gun Ownership Prevents Tyranny: 
Do High Rates of Gun Ownership Protect Democracies? Data Points to a Resounding No, 
THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 30, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2JiKiNv; Mark Nuckols, Why the 
‘Citizen Militia’ Theory Is the Worst Pro-Gun Argument Ever, ATLANTIC (Jan. 31, 2013), 
https://bit.ly/3by6sav.  
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Amendment jurisprudence210 and scholarship.211 To that extent, weapons 
optimized for assassinations are optimized for the Second Amendment’s 
purported goal, and should receive special legal protection and 
encouragement, rather than legal restrictions. For me, specialized 
assassination guns simply highlight the perverseness of the anti-tyranny 
argument.  
On a more mundane level, these next-generation weapons with super-
lethality could force our criminal justice system to revisit long-held 
assumptions about the proper line between intentional and unintentional 
homicides. Would it furnish an affirmative defense, or at least a mitigating 
factor in the gradation of charges or sentences, if the weapon used is one 
that assists in completing the shot in the last instant when a regular shooter 
might hesitate or reconsider? Conversely, if a shooter uses a gun that 
guarantees death, does this create a legitimate inference (thinking in terms 
of jury instructions) of more or clearer premeditation and deliberateness, 
and therefore more culpability? The question is whether a semi-
autonomous weapon undermines, or intensifies, the scienter element of the 
crime. 
A similar conundrum may arise when judges and juries assess 
attempted versus completed crimes. When is the crime complete with 
these guns? When the shooter tags the target and pulls the trigger, or a few 
seconds later when the gun decides to discharge the round? If “attempt” 
cases turn on what constitutes enough steps in preparation, furtherance, 
and execution, does buying a guarantee-kill sniper rifle count as more 
steps toward completion than a regular gun? Can new technology function 
as skipping steps in executing a plan?  
Precision-guided firearms also raise new questions about the right of 
self-defense. A specialized weapon guaranteed to kill its target might 
move an incident along a continuum away from a spontaneous reaction to 
danger and closer toward a preplanned killing that is merely waiting for 
an opportunity, that is, waiting for the other party to provide an imminent 
 
210. See, e.g., Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 686 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Early 
American legislators and commentators understood the Second Amendment and its state 
predecessors as protecting Americans against tyranny and oppression.”); Tyler v. Hillsdale 
Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 707 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Less obvious to the contemporary 
judicial mind are the Founding-era fears of tyranny and defenselessness that provided the 
impetus behind the Second Amendment.”); Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1196–98 
(2003) (discussing anti-tyranny purpose of Second Amendment). 
211. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second 
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 426–28 (2009); Stephanie Cooper Blum, 
Drying Up the Slippery Slope: A New Approach to the Second Amendment, 67 BUFF. L. 
REV. 961, 967 (2019); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and 
the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643 (1995); 
Darrell A. H. Miller, Institutions and the Second Amendment, 66 DUKE L. J. 69, 77 (2016); 
Douglas Walker, Jr., Necessary to the Security of Free States: The Second Amendment as 
the Auxiliary Right of Federalism, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 365, 369–70 (2016). 
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threat as an excuse.212 Joseph Blocher has observed that the laws regarding 
preparations for self-defense, embodied in the loose or discretionary “good 
cause” requirements in some states for a concealed carry permit, are less 
exacting than those required ex-post for justifying the use of lethal force 
in self-defense.213 Arming oneself (in private or public) as a preparatory 
measure for self-defense would generally have no requirement of an 
imminent threat or proportional force (both of which are difficult to 
foresee), but one could argue that a precision-guided firearm is at the 
maximum or outer bounds of proportional force for self-defense. 
Traditional self-defense jurisprudence also included a consideration of 
proportionality,214 but these guns raise a novel question about whether 
certainty of success is part of the proportionality question.215 Suppose, for 
example, that the force (say, the caliber of weapon) is an equal match,216 
 
212. See Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public, 
127 HARV. L. REV FOR. 218, 221 (2014) (“Self-defense law is about ex post risk 
assessment, in the sense that the event has already happened, and the law seeks to determine 
whether the self-defender’s actions were reasonable and proportional to the threat Good 
cause requirements do the same thing from an ex ante perspective . . . .”). 
213. See id. Laying a lethal trap for an anticipated assailant—such as a spring gun or 
a spike-bottomed pit—is not legitimate self-defense, see Toomer v. William C. Smith & 
Co., Inc., 112 A.3d 324, 326 (D.C.App. March 26, 2015); Sydnor v. State, 776 A.2d 669, 
677  (Md.App. July 20, 2001); J. D. Perovich, Use of Set Gun, Trap, or Similar Device on 
Defendant’s Own Property, 47 A.L.R.3d 646 (1973).  On the other hand, shooting an 
assailant normally is. See Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second 
Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 85 (2020); Fritz Allhoff, Self-Defense Without 
Imminence, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1527, 1527-29 (2019). I am arguing that precision-
guided firearms fall somewhere on the boundary between these two.  
214. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Self-Defense and Culpability: Fault Forfeits First, 
55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 258–59 (2018); Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, The 
Second Amendment As Positive Law, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 103, 110–11 (2018); Lisa 
Hecht, Provocateurs and Their Rights to Self-Defence, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 165, 169 (2019) 
(“In ordinary self-defence cases, proportionality is a constraint on the permissible use of 
force and the forfeiture of defensive rights.”); Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 
40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1659 (2019) (“These four elements—imminence of threat, 
necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness—form the legal bounds of traditional self-
defense doctrine.”); see also Commonwealth v. Abubardar, 120 N.E.3d 1228, 1230 (Mass. 
2019) (whether “the degree of force used was reasonable in the circumstances, with 
proportionality being the touchstone for assessing reasonableness.”); United States v. 
Black, 692 F.2d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Under the traditional rule, the quantum of force 
which one may use in self-defense is proportional to the threat which he reasonably 
apprehends . . . . Under this notion of proportionality, a danger which is not so great as to 
justify an actual killing in self-defense may nevertheless be serious enough to justify an 
unexecuted threat to use deadly force.”). 
215. While the question of guaranteed success may be novel, there is a significant 
body of literature, especially in the field of moral philosophy, about guaranteed failure of 
defensive force negating the proportionality requirement – the traditional consensus has 
been that futile uses of force do not count as legitimate self-defense. See Arneson, supra 
note 213, at 258–59. This is called the “success condition” of proportionality. See id. 
216. Force does not have to be precisely proportionate in order to satisfy the 
requirements for legitimate self-defense; usually the question for courts is simply the 
broad-brush question of lethal versus nonlethal force. See Rolnick, supra note 213, at 1681 
(noting that “self-defense laws in most states relax this proportionality requirement 
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does the elimination of the possibility of a shooter missing a shot, or the 
reduced ability of the eventual victim to dodge bullets change the 
proportionality of force, or is it irrelevant? The Heller decision, which 
established that the Second Amendment serves a core value of individuals 
arming themselves for self-defense, did not introduce a doctrinal change 
to the law of self-defense and proportionality.217 In practice, however, if 
more citizens have private arsenals post-Heller, defensive gun use would 
likely: become more common; increase the number of self-defense 
incidents falling at the high end of permissible proportionality (with 
regards to force); and increase the chances that self-defense would cross 
the line into disproportionate force. Some commentators have argued that 
trendy “stand your ground” laws eliminate or severely limit the traditional 
proportionality requirement for self-defense.218 Note that Texas law allows 
private citizens to use lethal force (including a firearm) to stop a fleeing 
felon or to protect property, even when the property owner is not in 
danger.219 Suppose, however, that the legislature enacted such a law in a 
context that included numerous tacit assumptions about probability and 
certainty of success. If we assume that it is a rare event for an armed 
civilian being in the right place at the right time to have a clear shot at a 
fleeing felon, and that even in such a situation the civilian may miss, the 
benefits of armed civilians helping catch fleeing felons in exigent 
circumstances might have outweighed the contemplated benefits. But 
what if a TrackingPoint weapon allows an armed civilian  to potentially 
call in a small, but precision-guided missile airstrike on any fleeing felon? 
If the technology opens the way for many new possible scenarios, a 
legislature might enact a different law, or at least a differently worded law. 
The same would apply to shooting trespassers—if permitting lethal force 
to defend one’s property assumed physical proximity of the property 
owner and the trespasser/burglar, the situation might present very different 
moral and policy concerns if we mean a guaranteed kill of someone 1400 
yards away, at the outer edge of one’s land.   
If law enforcement adopts these weapons, it would raise unanswered 
questions about police shootings of fleeing suspects220—again, due to the 
 
slightly, in that they permit the use of deadly force in response to a threat of death or certain 
other violent crimes, most commonly robbery, rape, and kidnapping.”). 
217. See Cody J. Jacobs, The Second Amendment and Private Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
945, 984 (2017) (“Thus, it seems unlikely that Heller will ultimately be read to require any 
change to the self-defense proportionality requirement.”).  
218. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Value of Life: Constitutional Limits o Citizens’ 
Use Of Deadly Force, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 623, 641 (2014) (“This ‘rule’ effectively 
eliminates the traditional requirement that the use of force in self-defense be proportional 
to the threat (i.e., that deadly force only be used to resist an imminent threat of death or 
serious harm).”). 
219. See Rolnick, supra note 213, at 1683. 
220. See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985)(leading case on lawful 
use of lethal force by police to stop fleeing suspects); Nancy C. Marcus, From Edward to 
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guaranteed death of the moving target and the fleeing suspect’s inability 
to dodge a bullet. The situation is analogous to those involving law 
enforcement use of armed drones or bomb-carrying robots,221 and it 
changes the equation for justified use of force—the officer is far enough 
away to be out of immediate danger, and the likelihood of death is higher. 
Traditional deference to police shootings of fleeing felons may have rested 
partly on the usually tacit assumption that it is too difficult for police to 
shoot precisely at a moving target in the heat of the moment, that is, too 
difficult for police to ensure a shot will stop the fleeing suspect to facilitate 
apprehension, rather than executing the suspect. We now have technology 
that would enable the police to do just that, and I would argue that police 
should have a duty not to use a guaranteed-lethal shot. At the least, the 
greater the certainty that a fleeing person will die should raise the duty of 
the officer to have an articulable, compelling reason to execute the person. 
Fortunately, statistical data suggests that police killings have been on the 
decline overall.222 As mentioned above, arming police with any type of 
lethal firearms presents the same moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems that guns always introduce into a situation. Police are more 
likely to make risky choices when they have guns, and risky people are 
more likely to become police when the police have guns. Guns with super-
lethality simply raise the moral hazard and adverse selection quotients. 
Even the presumed value or virtue of sports shooting and hunting 
comes into question when we consider a gun that does not miss. An 
assortment of state and federal laws place restrictions on hunting by 
methods that eliminate “fair chase” in addition to seasonal restrictions, 
licenses and permits, and limits on kills.223 Federal law restricts hunting 
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from aircraft,224 and some states have tried to limit hunting from vehicles 
or “canned hunting,” trophy hunting of trapped or fenced-in animals.225 
These regulations do not clearly infringe on the Second Amendment.226 As 
hunting technology advances, “sport hunters have had to impose voluntary 
restrictions on their ability to hunt to give the animal a chance to escape,” 
which would otherwise eliminate “the essential character of the hunt.”227 
Arguably, precision-guided hunting rifles—essentially guaranteed to hit 
the target—approach these boundaries, although hunters still have to find 
the prey and tag it, and would have to have made the prior decision to hunt 
with a TrackingPoint gun. TrackingPoint rifles would be especially useful 
for hunting from a vehicle or aircraft, for example, because the gun can 
lock on a moving target from a long distance. Some commentators have 
recently critiqued, or debunked, the conventional wisdom that hunting 
helps with wildlife conservation.228 This is relevant for the larger 
discussion of the morality of sports hunting, especially with precision-
guided firearms. 
Modern militaries use training to overcome the instinctive aversion 
to killing that most people have. “Interspecies homicide,” as some military 
psychologists call it,229 comes easier for normal psyches if individuals can 
distance themselves from their own actions.230 The concept was developed 
by Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall during World War II and was 
outlined in his controversial book Men Against Fire. 231 Marshall claimed 
that the ratio of rounds fired compared to hits was low because the majority 
of soldiers were not actually aiming at their targets.232 Though Marshall’s 
 
224. See Roberto Iraola, The Airborne Hunting Act, 41 No. 3 CRIM. LAW BULL. 280, 
280 (2005). 
225. Laura J. Ireland, Canning Canned Hunts: Using State and Federal Legislation 
to Eliminate the Unethical Practice of Canned “Hunting”, 8 ANIMAL L. 223, 224 (2002) 
(“[C]anned hunts are inhumane, unethical, and should not exist.”). 
226. Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
133, 137 (2015) (arguing that hunting and recreational uses of arms have, at best, a tenuous 
claim to Second Amendment protection). 
227. Braverman, supra note 222, at 149. 
228. See, e.g., Myanna Dellinger, Trophy Hunting - A Relic of the Past, 34 J. ENVTL. 
L. & LITIG. 25, 26 (2019) (arguing that “the hunting of endangered and threatened species 
for mere ‘sport’ should be outlawed and that the transborder transportation of parts of 
trophy-hunted animals should be more closely examined and restricted than what is 
currently the case.”); Myanna Dellinger, Trophy Hunting Contracts: Unenforceable for 
Reasons of Public Policy, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 396 (2016); see generally Zoe 
Verhoeven, Note, The Myth of Hunting as a Conservation Tool in the Crosshairs, Facing 
Extinction, 95 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 68 (2018) (critiquing the purported conservation 
benefits of hunting).  
229. Peter Maass, A Bulletproof Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at 52.  
230. See Stephen Evans, How Soldiers Deal with the Job of Killing, BBC NEWS (June 
11, 2011), https://bbc.in/2UHFI1M. 
231. See generally SAMUEL LYMAN ATWOOD MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FIRE: THE 
PROBLEM OF BATTLE COMMAND (1947) ([parenthetical]).  
232. See id. at 50–63. 
730 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:3 
study has largely been discredited, his premise that the lethality of a soldier 
is hindered by their inherent human aversion to killing remains the 
conventional wisdom among military trainers.233 In response to Marshall’s 
ideas, the military made two major changes to the way it trained 
soldiers.234 First, training methods were adopted to make soldiers more 
comfortable with firing at humans.235 For example, the military stopped 
using bullseyes for shooting practice and instead used human-shaped cut-
outs.236 Today, combat training uses targets with human faces that pop up 
unexpectedly. Second, exercises were modified to be more similar to 
combat conditions and were repeated by soldiers “until their reactions 
became second nature.”237 Modern combat drills are run with greater 
frequency, under conditions far more reflective of an actual battlefield.238 
The result of the new training methods is that firing at human targets has 
become an almost automatic response.239 As Special Forces Master 
Sergeant Danny Leonard put it: “It’s so instantaneous . . . . You don’t even 
realize you did it.”240 The new generation of firearms is an extension of 
that automation. “Digital fire-control systems,” like the one the Army is 
seeking for new weapons orders, would allow soldiers “to engage targets 
faster and with greater precision.”241 They can pair with goggles via a 
wireless link, allowing the shooter to fire from behind cover.242 By making 
killing more reflexive, semi-autonomous weapons take away some of the 
shooter’s choice. By removing a degree of human involvement, 
autonomous functions insulate, to an extent, the individual operator’s 
sense of personal culpability.  
Major Peter Kilner, a West Point philosophy and ethics professor, 
argues that allowing soldiers to avoid confronting killing on a personal 
level during battle “leave[s] them more prone to psychological traumas 
after the training is finished.”243 Further, autonomous targeting impacts the 
operator’s risk perception and therefore influences their decision-making 
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process.244 Operators of autonomous weapons may feel empowered by the 
automatic targeting functions. As TrackingPoint boasts, their Precision-
Guided Firearm (“PGF”) takes “the stress and nerves out of shooting” and 
allows the shooter to focus purely on taking the shot.245 One expert warns 
that individuals who possess a gun that cannot miss have less motivation 
to de-escalate situations and avoid violence, preferring to rely instead on 
the method with the assured outcome.246 Philosopher and ethicist Jonathan 
Moreno, expressed concern that semi-autonomous weapons would 
provide authorities with a shortcut around hostage and standoff 
negotiations.247 “If their intuition says this guy is not going to engage in a 
conversation very long . . . would that make them feel more comfortable 
using the weapon?”248 
“Responsibility gap” is the term some researchers use to describe the 
complications of ascribing liability for injury resulting from a decision that 
was made in part by a person and in part by autonomous technology.249 
Autonomous weapons grant untrained, novice shooters the reflexivity and 
emotional distance associated with military engagement and the precision 
of a master marksman. Of course, as TrackingPoint points out in their 
promotional materials, their firearms are not fully autonomous.250 After the 
shooter makes the initial targeting decisions, TrackingPoint firearms 
control the decision to take the final shot.  
Before closing this section, it is worth mentioning an even newer, but 
more modest, variation on guns that cannot miss: another new product line 
by Australian gunmaker Radetec, mentioned above. Radetec makes a non-
obtrusive attachment for a few popular models of firearms (such as a 
Glock handgun or an AR-15) that will fire only when pointed at an 
electronically-designated target downrange.251 This product is meant for 
shooting ranges and shooting schools, and avoids stray off-target shots (by 
amateur shooters or accidental un-aimed discharges) from injuring others 
or even from wasting rounds that would not land somewhere on the target. 
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The product is affordable (a few hundred dollars). For shooting ranges and 
schools, Radetec has a system that allows a trainer to disable all the trainee 
guns in the line at once, a very useful feature when giving instructions to 
the group. It is easy to imagine Radetec’s products having consumer 
appeal for armories, shootings ranges, and shooting schools (including 
police academies and military training bases), and there could be 
secondary or spillover benefits for the gun community generally.   
IV. GUNS THAT TRACK EVERYTHING 
Another line of emerging firearm technology is digital tracking of a 
gun’s location, movements, and discharge. Products are already on the 
market that offer audio/video uploads from the scope, but the more 
sophisticated technology has nuanced movement tracking, similar to the 
“black box” in an automobile that constantly records speed, acceleration, 
braking, and turns. These are firearms or firearm attachments that can 
record the movements, location, and time/direction of discharge. Such 
record-creation and archiving of data could raise accountability for law 
enforcement, similar to the policy rationales for police bodycams,252 and 
also enhance justifications for shootings, validating a subsequent claim of 
self-defense by a civilian gun owner. Documenting that a shooting was 
justified could be beneficial if it protects police, and even private gun 
owners, from wrongful accusations or prosecution. On the other hand, an 
ex-ante belief that it will be easier to show the legitimacy of a shooting 
after the fact can subconsciously make police or private gun owners less 
hesitant or more likely to take a questionable shot, which is not necessarily 
a good thing.  
Some of these technologies overlap with what gun safety advocates 
wanted with their version of “smart guns.” But the TrackingPoint guns, 
which also boast this technology, are clearly more lethal, but not 
necessarily safer. Some of these recordkeeping guns—whether market-
ready, prototypes, or merely concepts—use blockchain ledger technology 
for recordkeeping and security, which Part V will address separately. For 
purposes of this section, it is enough to note that recordkeeping guns may 
or may not use blockchain; and that some use (or propose to use) audio-
video feeds uploaded to the Internet. Conversely, blockchain technology 
is a core component of a wide range of firearm-related new technologies, 
so it deserves a separate section. 
One recent legal commentator explained the usefulness for police of 
firearm tracking technology this way: 
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[The Internet of Things] will also be beneficial for local law 
enforcement. For example, Yardarm Technologies has developed 
smart firearms, accessories, and sensor technology that can monitor 
and record data each time the weapon is discharged. Some police 
departments, including Santa Cruz, California, and Carrollton, Texas, 
have started to test these devices, and the smart guns also contain either 
biometric fingerprint sensor technology on the triggers, or smart 
bracelets that use RFID microchips, such that only the assigned officer 
is able to discharge the weapon.253 
A startup called Justifire254 has a product based on the same idea, but 
in reverse, as having smart guns track police use to help hold officers 
accountable for shootings (the gun automatically records every movement, 
trigger pull, angle, location, etc.). Justifire is for civilian gun owners who 
plan to use their guns to kill in self-defense and worry that they will face 
criminal charges afterward (or a wrongful death suit)255 if nobody believes 
their version of what transpired. These gun attachments work with existing 
handguns and record everything—gun movement and location, firing, and 
even audio/visual.256 There is already inferential evidence for current 
consumer demand for such technology: the existing market for gun 
owner’s legal insurance. 
More limited internal tracking is available from Radetec, an 
Australian firearm manufacturer. Radetec sells attachments (costing 
$139–$299) for existing 1911s, Beretta handguns, and AR-15s that 
provide a digital display on one side of the weapon to show how many 
rounds remain in the magazine,257 or (in a replacement slide on the butt of 
the handgun) how many shots the gun has fired,258 which is useful for 
maintenance purposes. The latter is analogous to an odometer on a car, 
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which helps owners stay on an optimal maintenance schedule for oil 
changes, tune-ups, and other parts replacement.  
V. BLOCKCHAIN AND GLOCKCHAIN 
Blockchain is a newer type of digital ledger technology (“DLT”), best 
known for its association with Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.259 Like 
many disruptive technologies—which first capture the public imagination 
or garner headlines—a certain amount of hype has surrounded 
blockchain.260 For readers unfamiliar with blockchain, it is a type of 
decentralized, verifiable digital recordkeeping, a bit like a cross between 
a notary public and the practice of emailing a backup of an important 
document to ten different trustworthy friends who are always online (an 
obvious oversimplification). Blockchain often incorporates encryption 
and multiple-location independent backups of the data to help make the 
information more invulnerable to malicious manipulation, data loss, or 
unauthorized access. Blockchain and other DLTs can function as an 
unalterable, automatically recorded ledger of specific events or 
occurrences.261 It facilitates both trust and privacy in a world of 
anonymous or international transactions. 
A few academic researchers have proposed ways that blockchain 
technology could work with firearm sales, usage, or firearm regulation.262 
Several tech blogs subsequently reported on this or promoted it,263 and 
some of the next-generation smart gun startups incorporated blockchain at 
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the core of their product idea.264 One group of researchers, under the 
auspices of Ideo coLab, gave their project the catchy name 
“Glockchain,”265 though the project is unrelated to the firearms 
manufacturer known as Glock. 
The Glockchain project aims to incorporate DLT into a firearm so 
that it records each time the gun fires, along with its precise location, and 
the blockchain records are completely secure and accurate.266 The 
developers had police in mind as the potential users of this product to 
augment police accountability when a police shooting occurs with a 
service weapon.267 If a rampaging active shooter were using gun 
technology (which seems incredibly unlikely), police could theoretically 
have a faster response time and could more easily identify the shooter, 
especially if the active shooter used the feature to broadcast his shot 
numbers through social media during his rampage.268 This is a type of 
guns-that-track-everything, discussed in the previous Part,269 that uses 
blockchain technology for its recordkeeping. The most promising use for 
this product is for the police and the military. For the police, this could 
provide increased accountability and/or validation (and, hence, 
legitimacy) in the same way that bodycams do. This technology helps 
military officers and commanders see through the chaos of the battlefield 
and identify which of their soldiers is firing and from where; it would also 
help prevent or track desertions, defections, lost or stolen munitions, and 
so on. 
Other researchers have published or circulated manuscripts detailing 
a blockchain-based replacement for the firearm purchase background 
check system in the United States.270 The proposals each have some 
variations, but all include some type of blockchain registry or ledger for 
every firearm, either with built-in automatic recording and ledger 
technology or based on the existing embossed serial number system, 
combined with a blockchain owner or user registry or blockchain wallet. 
The goal of these proposals is primarily to enable law enforcement tracing 
of crime guns, but each of the proposals contemplates replacing the 
existing FBI National Instant Background Check System (“NICS”). This 
replacement background check system would have a decentralized 
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blockchain verification system for ensuring that only authorized users can 
purchase or carry firearms,271 although some bloggers envision a 
blockchain system to feed the data directly into the NICS database, making 
it much more accurate and comprehensive. The Firearm Accountability 
Auditability Blockchain Solution (“FAABS”) system would create a 
private-sector decentralized registry of gun owners (federal statutes 
prohibit the federal government from creating a gun owner registry, 
though states may currently do this, such as California). It would also help 
with “police spot checks”—officers who encounter someone with a gun 
could immediately verify if the individual is a lawful possessor.272 FAABS 
is a private nonprofit. The advantage of a private-sector voluntary registry 
is that no state action could implicate constitutional concerns (i.e., Second 
Amendment), nor would private actors violate the federal statutory 
prohibition on a government-operated gun registry.273  
These proposals rest on some dubious assumptions, or simple 
misunderstandings, about millions of gun owners in America (many of 
who are vehemently opposed to any type of gun owner registry, as they 
believe it inevitably leads to a gun confiscation), and the number of guns 
already in circulation (estimated to be more than the total population of 
the United States). Most prohibited purchasers are convicted felons, 
wanted fugitives, and undocumented immigrants. Those prohibited 
purchasers adjudicated as mentally impaired and those dishonorably 
discharged from the military, grouped together, form a smaller group than 
the first three categories. Normally, members of these groups (especially 
convicted felons) know that they cannot pass a background check, and 
would simply steal or borrow someone’s firearm or pay a premium to an 
aftermarket seller who would agree not to record the transaction to the 
blockchain ledger. Unless all current gun owners voluntarily comply with 
using a system of non-governmental blockchain tracking, using 
blockchain to trace guns requires replacing the more than 300 million 
firearms already in circulation with guns that have automatic blockchain 
recording—an unrealistic suggestion, both politically and financially. The 
current guns in circulation will continue in circulation for decades, unless 
the government undertakes a massive confiscation-buyback or an outright 
ban. The hostility to blockchain registries and gun tracking is evident in 
the 2017 Arizona statute prohibiting the implementation of any such 
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system.274 The proposals emphasize that the blockchain encryption would 
protect the privacy of gun owners, but not as much as if the owners simply 
refused to participate, that is, to stay off-grid from the blockchain ledger. 
Unfortunately, national gun owner registries are simply a non-starter in the 
United States under current laws and partisan platforms. Some of the 
writers on this subject even suggest that hackers could currently discover 
who does not own a gun, so that criminals could target non-owners. But 
this assumes that there is an existing registry of gun owners (there is not) 
that would allow those with access to make such a determination by 
elimination. 
Similarly, a recurring suggestion through all the commentary about 
blockchain and background checks is that it would help the background 
check system to be hacker-proof and more accurate. However, there are 
no reported incidents of anyone hacking into the NICS databases, either to 
modify or delete unfavorable records. There is no reason for anyone to do 
so. A prohibited person (someone falling under one of the nine prohibiting 
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) is still under the legal prohibition even if 
their information is missing from the NICS system—a felon-in-possession 
is still a felon-in-possession if they have a felony conviction and have a 
gun. Deleting one’s information from the NICS database would not make 
it legal for a prohibited person to purchase or own a gun. Moreover, any 
prohibited persons undeterred by the legal prohibition can easily purchase 
used firearms from private unlicensed sellers without undergoing any 
background check. There is no current problem with security breaches of 
the NICS databases. Regarding accuracy, a 2017 report of an audit by the 
Office of the Inspector General found that the background checks are 
currently around 98% or 99% accurate, so there is room for improvement, 
but not much. NICS suffers from staffing shortages and underreporting of 
new records by courts, local law enforcement, and mental health care 
providers (all of which are already improving), but not from a significant 
percentage of mistakes. 
It is easier to imagine that gun owners with large collections—
especially if they buy, sell, and lend frequently—might want to use the 
Guniary app or Radetec Armorer Logbook275 to keep an inventory of their 
weapons and ammunition. Armories, shooting ranges, and shooting 
schools, which often have guns available for rental or temporary use, are 
also easy to envision as users of a blockchain-based tracking system like 
Guniary or even FAABS. It also seems within the realm of possibility that 
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so I mention it only in passing in this section.  
738 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 124:3 
some states would require—either through legislation or regulation—that 
shooting ranges and shooting schools use such a system. Similarly, it is 
certainly possible that at some point the FBI would incorporate blockchain 
technology into its NICS databases, NICS instant background checks by 
licensed gun dealers, or to streamline records uploading from local law 
enforcement and local courts, though other automatic reporting software 
might accomplish the same thing more efficiently than blockchain.   
Another promising application for private-sector blockchain 
registries is voluntary self-registration of conscientious nonowners—those 
conscientiously opposed to gun ownership, who want to signal their 
convictions and commitment to the renunciation of gun rights. A 
companion article276 to this one argues for a system of voluntary self-
enlistment in the NICS database for those who do not want to buy or 
possess guns for moral reasons. Ian Ayers and Fred Vars have argued for 
a similar self-registration for suicidal individuals, and their proposal has 
become a reality in Washington state via legislative enactment.277 Gun 
rights repudiation requires a system of verification or certification to give 
gravitas and credibility to the decision to renounce firearm ownership 
permanently. This credibility and gravitas are necessary for renunciation 
to serve exemplary purposes for influencing social norms, fostering 
cohesiveness and identity within the gunless movement, and moral self-
signaling. Government registration and certification of nonowners 
voluntarily seems to be the most powerful way to accomplish this, but a 
decentralized blockchain self-registry could be a viable second-best 
option, though it would not achieve the goal of rendering oneself unable 
to purchase a gun or subject to firearm forfeiture, as a government-
sponsored system would.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The emerging technology with firearms has branched in different 
directions, so that we can no longer refer to smart guns as a monolithic 
item. Some are safer, while others are more dangerous; some are a new 
type of weapon, while others are attachable and detachable with older 
mechanical firearms. Although consumers might prefer safety features on 
many products, with firearms there is a longstanding divergence between 
 
276. See Drury Stevenson, Going Gunless, 85 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
277. See generally Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Libertarian Gun Control, 167 U. 
PA. L. REV. 921, 922–23 (2019) (discussing legislative implementation or proposals in 
various states); Fredrick E. Vars, Not Young Guns Anymore: Dementia and the Second 
Amendment, 25 ELDER L.J. 51 (2017)(discussing proposal to help elderly individuals avoid 
dementia-related suicide); Angela Selvaggio & Fredrick E. Vars, “Bind Me More Tightly 
Still”: Voluntary Restraint Against Gun Suicide, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 671 (2016) (legislative 
proposal to allow suicidal individuals to register for a do-not-sell list for firearms); Fredrick 
E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465 (2015) (same). 
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the market-driven advances in technology and the policy-driven pushes for 
new development. The market demand drives the technology toward 
cheaper, more lethal, and more convenient to carry guns. The policy 
agenda, of course, moves toward reducing injuries and deaths, which 
impose high social costs. The tensions presented by new firearm 
technology are an outgrowth of the collective action problem or tragedy 
of the commons inherent in safety and security. Safety and security are a 
public good; low rates of violence are part of this public good.278 Arming 
oneself for one’s safety and security could maximize an individual’s good, 
but a completely unarmed community would have less violence overall, 
or at least less lethal violence. If guns are good at all, it is under a Theory 
of Second Best, a type of necessary evil.  
Electronically personalized guns—what most people mean when 
they refer to “smart guns”—could help reduce gun injuries and deaths, 
especially for children and teens, but they would certainly not solve 
everything, or even most of the gun deaths. It may be worth encouraging 
the development of the technology to save a few hundred lives per year, 
but advocates (and politicians) should not overpromise what the 
technology could achieve. Personalized smart guns would be unlikely to 
have much impact on the horrific rampage of shootings in schools and 
other places crowded with innocent, unsuspecting civilians. Personalized 
smart guns, even if popular, may have little impact on domestic gun 
violence and elderly suicides (which comprise a huge share of annual gun 
deaths) or on interpersonal revenge.  
Technology also affects public morality by providing new 
comparison benchmarks. Precision-guided guns, due to their infallible 
lethality, might make traditional, mechanical guns seem more legitimate 
by comparison. It may be that the greatest harm presented by precision-
guided firearms is not how the owners use them, but that they make other 
guns seem (deceptively) harmless, tame, and unremarkable. This would 
depend on the guns becoming well-known to the public and assimilated 
into the cultural semiotics of weaponry, which does not necessarily 
correlate to the number of guns in circulation. TrackingPoint guns and 
their progeny may remain an exotic luxury item for a long time, but if they 
capture a place in the public imagination, they could have an adverse 
influence as a comparison. Conversely, personalized smart guns could 
make regular guns seem reckless and unsafe by comparison, even if the 
smart guns never become the norm, as long as the public awareness or the 
salience of the item in the public’s imagination about weaponry becomes 
entrenched.   
 
278. For an excellent discussion of the aggregate effects of firearm prevalence or 
paucity on a community, see Powell v. State, No. 18-CV-6675, 2019 WL 4750265, at *2–
*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2019).   
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Recordkeeping and blockchain-enabled guns are likely to become 
more common, both for gun hobbyists (in the same way that wristband 
fitness trackers are appealing for exercise enthusiasts), police, military, 
and private security organizations that use software for tracking and re-
stocking ammunition inventory, firearm maintenance and replacement 
schedules, and so on. Many law enforcement and military organizations 
auction or sell their old firearms when they replace their inventory, so 
firearm features popular with these large-volume purchaser entities 
become familiar to gun dealers and private gun purchasers as well. I 
believe the main effect in the foreseeable future will be more efficiency in 
inventory management for such entities as well as administrative 
efficiency in law enforcement and military entities, bringing some savings 
to taxpayers. More speculatively, recordkeeping guns could eventually 
impact target practice behaviors and, indirectly, the shooting range 
industry, as these entities (as well as gun hobbyists) become more aware 
or self-conscious of the number of rounds they are using for practice, and 
the wear and tear that shooting range practice has on each firearm. 
None of the emerging technologies address the underlying moral 
dubiousness with killing in self-defense or defense of property, the 
immorality of sports hunting, the immorality of playing a part in a larger 
breakdown in collective action, or the erosion of a public good, like a 
nonviolent community. Even if the majority of jurists, or the majority of 
voters, believe that it is morally acceptable to kill another person when 
confronted with an immediate, unavoidable choice between the two lives 
(a view I do not share), such discourse merely deflects the harder questions 
of whether defensive gun use is an excusable, forgivable act or a virtuous, 
heroic one; or whether killing to save one’s own life, or the life of a loved 
one, is moral when nonlethal alternatives might also have worked. Gun 
ownership for self-defense not only presents moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, but also a crowding-out phenomenon as well as an 
individual under-investment in nonlethal force (say, a taser or a bat), locks 
and alarms, cultivating cautious and circumspect habits, and having an 
escape plan. A legal right to use lethal force in self-defense does not equal 
a moral right to do so, and even a moral right to kill does not equal a moral 
obligation. Zero guns would be better than smart guns.   
 
 
 
